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predict that every business soon would use an arbitration clause, coupled with
a class arbitration waiver, in their standard form contracts to avoid the risk of
class actions. We examine two samples of franchise agreements: one sample in
which we track changes in arbitration clauses since 1999, and a broader
sample focusing on changes since 2011, immediately before Concepcion was
decided. Our central finding is consistent across both samples of franchise
agreements: the use of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements has
increased since Concepcion, but not dramatically. Most franchisors have not
switched to arbitration. Our results necessarily are limited to franchise
agreements and may not be generalizable to consumer and employment
contracts. But they are consistent with the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau's preliminary results on changes in arbitration clause use in credit
card and checking account agreements since Concepcion.
We then consider why only a handful of franchisors have switched to
arbitration clauses since Concepcion. Those predicting a switch to arbitration
assume both that there is no reason for a business not to use an arbitral class
waiver and that businesses readily and costlessly can and will modify their
form contracts. In our view, both assumptions are subject to question. First,
some businesses have good reasons not to use an arbitration clause. By using
an arbitration clause, businesses contract for a bundle of dispute resolution
services, including, for example, a very limited right to appeal. If a business
perceives itself as unlikely to be subject to a class action, these "bundling costs"
may discourage the business from using an arbitration clause. Second,
standard form contracts, like negotiated contracts, might be resistant to
change even if change might be in the business's best interest-in other words,
standard form contracts might be "sticky." We find empirical evidence to
support both possible explanations. The Article concludes by considering how
the Court's subsequent decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant might affect the future use of arbitration clauses, as well as the
use of class action waivers that are not part of an arbitration clause.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion' has been described as a "crushing blow to consumers,"2 a
"disaster for consumer protection,"3 and "one of the most important
and favorable cases for businesses in a very long time."4 In
1. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
2. Bob Sullivan, After High Court Ruling, Firms Divide and Conquer in Consumer Cases,
http://perma.cc/6MCH-HCJY (nbcnews.com, archived Mar. 9, 2014) (quoting Ed Mierzwinski,
U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
3. Bruce D. Greenberg, A Poor Judicial Product and a Disaster for Consumer Protection: A
Lengthy Analysis of AT&T v. Concepcion, http://perma.cclWXP-864B (appellatelaw-nj.com,
archived Mar. 9, 2014); see also Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court's One Thousandth Cut Against
Consumers, http://perma.cc/6W68-WD4Z (thinkprogress.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014)
("[I]f Concepcion turns out badly it will be a disaster for millions of American consumers and a
green light for corporate America to scam us all a few dollars at a time.").
4. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts That Prohibit Class-Action Arbitration,
http://perma.cc/6N5W-W4K8 (nytimes.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014) ("The decision basically lets
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Concepcion, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
preempts state court decisions invalidating class arbitration waivers
as unconscionable.6 After Concepcion, commentators predicted that
every business soon would use an arbitration clause, coupled with a
class arbitration waiver, in their standard form contracts to avoid the
risk of class actions.6 A "tsunami"7 of these arbitral class waivers was
coming such that, "[a]fter Concepcion, it is only a matter of time before
nearly every credit card provider, cell phone company, mail-order
business or even every potential employer requires anyone who wants
to do business with them to first give up their right to file a class
action."8
More recently, a similar chorus of criticisms followed the
Supreme Court's decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant ("Amex"). 9 In Amex, the Court rejected the argument that
an arbitral class waiver was unenforceable because it precluded the
plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory rights, even though
the lack of class relief arguably made proving the federal antitrust
claim not economically feasible.' 0 This decision ended most if not all
remaining uncertainty over the enforceability of arbitral class
companies escape class actions, so long as they do so by means of arbitration
agreements .... This is a game-changer for businesses." (quoting Brian Fitzpatrick, Vanderbilt
University Law School)).
5. 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
6. See, e.g., Jean Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access
to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 718 (2012) ("In the future we can expect that far more companies
will impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate themselves from class
actions. .. ."); Steven Berk, EBay Offering Rare Chance to Opt-Out of Forced Arbitration,
http://perma.cc/DAN4-DX8E (thecorporateobserver.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014) ("At this point,
nearly every company that provides consumer goods or services, from Amazon to Verizon, now
requires users to agree to an arbitration clause. Companies are wasting no time in taking
advantage of the opportunity to smother those pesky class action suits before they even have a
chance to breathe."); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-Action Suits,
http://perma.ccIA7UG-M792 (sfgate.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014) ("Once given the green light, it
is hard to imagine any company would not want its shareholders, consumers and employees to
agree to [arbitration agreements with class waivers]."); Nathan Koppel, Will Federal Consumer
Bureau Ride to the Rescue of Class Actions?, http://perma.ce/533S-KA7G (blogs.wsj.com, archived
Mar. 10, 2014) ("Class-action bans are already pretty common in certain industries, such as
consumer credit and cell phones, and they are about to become much more common, lawyers
say.").
7. Myriam E. Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629 (2012).
8. Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Nukes Consumers'Rights in Most Pro-Corporate Decision
Since Citizens United, http://perma.cc/QK52-NSGZ (thinkprogress.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
9. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
10. Id. at 2309-10.
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waivers." Reiterating the refrains about Concepcion, commentators
quickly decried Amex as an "unmitigated disaster" and the "worst
Supreme Court arbitration decision ever."12 They predicted "a new
rash of companies issuing arbitration clauses that preclude class
actions."13
These empirical predictions are based on two seemingly self-
evident assumptions. The first is that, after Concepcion and Amex,
every business will benefit from using an arbitral class waiver to avoid
class actions. Businesses want to avoid class actions, and on this view,
there is no downside to using an arbitral class waiver to accomplish
that end. The writings of Myriam Gilles exemplify this first
assumption:
I regard it as inevitable that firms will ultimately act in their economic best interests,
and those interests dictate that virtually all companies will opt out of exposure to class
liability. Why wouldn't they? Once the [class] waivers gain broader acceptance and
recognition, it will become malpractice for corporate counsel not to include such clauses
in consumer and other class-action-prone contracts.14
The second assumption is that business parties can easily and
unilaterally change consumer contracts. Consumer contracts are not
like negotiated contracts between sophisticated parties, which may be
"sticky" and resistant to change. Gilles makes this assumption explicit
as well: "[M]ost companies can quickly amend their clauses in
response to or anticipation of litigation outcomes, revealing a nimble
and adaptive corporate feedback loop."15
11. But see infra note 70.
12. Paul Bland, Worst Supreme Court Arbitration Decision Ever, http://perma.cc/AKS6-
3UGR (publicjustice.net, archived Mar. 10, 2014); Jean Sternlight, American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant Guts Enforcement of Federal Laws, http://perma.cc/M95B-4T29
(indisputably.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
13. Matt Brownell, Forced Arbitration: Killing the Right to Sue Big Companies, One TOS
Agreement at a Time, http://perma.cc/ET99-4QM6 (dailyfinance.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014) ("If
the court does indeed rule in favor of American Express, look for even more businesses to find
ways to shield themselves from lawsuits."); In Court Rulings, Roberts Takes Long-Term
Approach, http://perma.cc/H5W5-G4YX (npr.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014) ("[A]ny smart business
today puts in a clause that says you must arbitrate, and you can't join up with other people to do
so, you can't do it in arbitration, you can't do it in court, you're on your own."); Sternlight, supra
note 12.
14. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377 (2005); see also Myriam Gilles, Gutting the
Vindication-of-Rights Challenge to Arbitration Agreements, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014) (manuscript at 1) (predicting that "one day soon, some unfortunate transactional lawyer
will be the first to be held liable for failing to insert an arbitration clause banning all aggregate
claiming in a standard form agreement"); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 7, at 629 (same).
15. Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining "Consumer-Friendly"
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 846 (2012);
see also Sternlight, supra note 6, at 718 ("For companies that fear being sued in class actions it
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It has now been more than two years since the decision in
Concepcion, long enough to evaluate, at least preliminarily, how
contracting practices have changed in response to the decision. This
paper is the first to study empirically the extent to which businesses
switched to arbitration after Concepcion. As the basis for our study,
we examine two samples of franchise agreements: one sample of
leading franchisors in which we track changes in arbitration clauses
since 1999 and one broader sample of franchisors focusing on changes
since 2011, immediately before Concepcion was decided.
Commentators have strongly urged franchisors, like consumer
businesses and employers, to switch to arbitration clauses after
Concepcion.16 Indeed, franchisors were among the first businesses to
use arbitration clauses as a "class action shield" back in the 1990s. 17
Moreover, franchise agreements exemplify a rare type of standard
form contract. They are publicly available in a systematic way, and a
reasonably lengthy history of the contracting practices is available.
While our results are limited to franchise agreements and may not be
generalizable to consumer and employment contracts, they
will be quite easy to insert class action waivers into small-print documents or online provisions
that they send or make available to their customers or employees."); Brownell, supra note 13
("It's easy for tech companies, websites and wireless carriers to insert arbitration clauses into
their contracts, because people are used to skipping the terms of service agreements and fine
print that accompany these services.").
16. Judy Rost et al., Comparative International Perspectives of Arbitration in the
Franchising Context, 31 FRANCHISE L.J. 124, 126 (2012) ("In the United States, one compelling
reason for franchisors to include an arbitration provision is as a potential means to avoid class
actions."); Anthony J. Calamunci, Concepcion v. AT&T: Its Impact on Franchise Law,
http://perma.cc/5KF4-2AQX (lexology.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014) ("Concepcion, when applied to
franchise agreements, grants franchisors the authority to draft much stronger language even
when the agreement is offered as a 'take-it or leave-it,' .... Franchisors should contact counsel
and sharpen their pencils. If there was ever a time to test the boundaries of the fine print, the
time is now!"); Martin Fern, Franchise Law Update: Protecting a Franchisor Against the Risk of
System-Wide Class Actions, http://perma.cc/4QRF-WW3R (foxrothschild.com, archived Mar. 10,
2014):
[The AT&T decision ends this debate [over the pros and cons of arbitration], at least
for franchisors and companies that provide contractual services to consumers, since it
is now clear that a franchisor may both mandate arbitration of franchisor-franchisee
disputes and preclude classwide arbitrations. This can effectively eliminate the risk of
a class action by franchisees against a franchisor. The AT&T decision now makes a
well-drafted arbitration clause an essential feature of every franchise agreement;
Kemp Sawers & Paul Russell, Franchise Report: Avoiding Class Arbitrations,
http://perma.ccl9P2V-HGA4 (bakerbotts.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014) ('The prudent franchisor
should not assume that the absence of express language authorizing class arbitration immunizes
the franchisor from class treatment. Instead, the safe course of action for franchisors is to include
a class arbitration waiver in franchise agreements.").
17. Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE
L.J. 141, 141 (1997).
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nonetheless provide valuable evidence on how at least some
businesses are responding to Concepcion.18
Our central finding is consistent across both samples of
franchise agreements: the predicted tsunami of arbitral class waivers
has not occurred. The use of arbitration clauses in franchise
agreements has increased since Concepcion, but not dramatically, and
most franchisors have not switched to arbitration. The reason is not
that all franchisors were already using arbitration before
Concepcion.19 Indeed, less than one-half or two-thirds of franchisors
(depending on the sample) used arbitration clauses in their standard
form contracts immediately prior to Concepcion.20 Franchisors had
plenty of room to switch to arbitration, but they have not done so in
any substantial way.
Given our finding that only a handful of franchisors have
switched to arbitration clauses since Concepcion, the next question is,
"Why not?" We examine the two assumptions underlying the
predictions of a tsunami of arbitration clauses and find reason to
question both. First, by using an arbitration clause, businesses do
more than simply contract out of class actions: they contract for a
bundle of dispute resolution services, including a very limited right to
appeal. For businesses that perceive themselves as unlikely to be sued
in a class action, and hence to receive little benefit from an arbitral
class waiver, the other services bundled with the waiver of class
actions may discourage them from using an arbitration clause. We call
18. Our findings are consistent with preliminary results released by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau on changes in the use of arbitration clauses in credit card and
checking agreements since Concepcion. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 54-57 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/Y244-5FTM (finding only a
slight increase in the use of arbitration clauses); see infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that other industries might have shifted more strongly toward
arbitration since Concepcion. Thus, Microsoft, Sony, and other software and online companies
have announced since Concepcion that they were adopting arbitration clauses in their end-user
license agreements. We seek to reconcile these anecdotal reports with our empirical findings
later in the paper. See infra text accompanying notes 159-72.
19. By comparison, the limited empirical evidence on the use of arbitration clauses by
mobile-wireless-services providers suggests that almost all facilities-based operators already use
arbitration clauses, in which case of course one would not expect a major move toward
arbitration by such businesses. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O'Hara O'Connor,
Unbundling Procedure, 66 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (finding that 11 of 12 facilities-based
operators used arbitration clauses).
20. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19; see also Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"
Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 727 (finding that 45% of franchise agreements
contained arbitration clauses in 1999); Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There
a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 95 (2008) (finding that 43.7% of franchise
agreements contained arbitration clauses in 2007).
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the costs resulting from these bundled services "bundling costs."
Second, even standard form contracts might be "sticky"-that is,
resistant to change even if change might be in the business's best
interest. We find empirical support for both possible explanations for
why many businesses have not switched to arbitration clauses after
Concepcion.21
We then consider the potential implications of Amex for the
future use of arbitration clauses. Of course, if all businesses switched
to arbitration because of Concepcion, Amex likely would have little
additional effect. But given our finding that such a switch has not
occurred, the question then is, "How is Amex likely to affect
contracting behavior?" If businesses have not switched to arbitration
clauses because of post-Concepcion uncertainty over the enforceability
of arbitral class waivers, Amex largely removes that uncertainty. The
expected result would be an increased use of arbitration clauses. If,
however, businesses have not switched to arbitration clauses for
reasons other than legal uncertainty, Amex will not make arbitration
more attractive. Other characteristics of arbitration (such as the
limited right to appeal) might explain franchisors' decisions not to
switch. To the extent these bundling costs deter the use of arbitral
class waivers, businesses still might not switch to arbitration.
Likewise, to the extent contract stickiness explains the limited switch
to arbitration, Amex will have limited effect.
That said, Amex might actually make an alternative to arbitral
class waivers-what we call nonarbitral class waivers-more attractive
than before. Nonarbitral class waivers are waivers of class actions
that are not part of an arbitration clause. 22 The parties remain in
court but waive class actions by contract. Nonarbitral class waivers
clauses are not as common as arbitral class waivers, but they do
exist.23 Although on its facts Amex addresses the enforceability of
arbitral class waivers, much of the Court's reasoning applies as well to
nonarbitral class waivers. Indeed, in our view, Amex might be better
understood not as a case about arbitration clauses but as a case about
class actions. Read broadly, Amex could be construed as making class
actions waiveable even without the use of an arbitration clause.
Nonarbitral class waivers are beneficial for businesses because they
avoid the bundling costs of an arbitral class waiver: businesses can
avoid class actions but can otherwise litigate in court (maintaining full
21. For another possible reason, see infra note 82.
22. We elaborate on the importance of this technical distinction in Part II.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 198-99.
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appeal rights, for example). Of course, even after Amex, much legal
uncertainty remains about the enforceability of nonarbitral class
waivers, and we certainly do not predict a "tsunami" of such waivers.
But on the margin, this broad interpretation of Amex makes
nonarbitral class waivers more attractive and might increase their use
(an increase that was occurring even before Amex, at least in franchise
agreements).
This Article and its findings are important for a number of
reasons. First, and most obviously, the findings call into question
some of the empirical predictions following Concepcion and Amex. So
far, it is simply not true that all or even most businesses are switching
to arbitration clauses after Concepcion. To be clear, however, whether
businesses have broadly switched to arbitration clauses with class
waivers is not the same question as whether courts have applied
Concepcion to dismiss claims seeking class relief in court, or even
whether Concepcion (and Amex) might result in the end of consumer
and other contract-based class actions. We offer no views here on how
courts have applied Concepcion, and we readily acknowledge that the
businesses most likely to be subject to class actions, or at least that so
perceive themselves, are the ones most likely to use arbitral class
waivers. 24
Second, the Article cautions against unquestioning acceptance
of the common parade-of-horribles arguments marshaled in
courtrooms around the nation, including the Supreme Court of the
United States. At a high level of abstraction, this argument typically
takes the following form: if the court decides the case in a certain
manner, an avalanche of undesirable behavior will surely follow. In
the specific context of contract cases, the argument unfolds in this
manner: if the court enforces certain contractual terms in a firm's
contract, similarly situated firms will flock to the approved language,
often to the detriment of other constituencies like consumers or
employees. In whatever context, though, arguments of this sort
ultimately entail predictions about human (or firm) behavior. At the
time those predictions are advanced, they should have some empirical
foundation. Yet often they do not. Moreover, after the court decides
the case, those predictions should be tested empirically. Yet often they
are not. Not only does this state of affairs sully the quality of legal
argument, it risks the court basing its decision on an invalid empirical
premise.
24. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card
Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 536, 540 (2012).
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Third, the Article offers a first look at how the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Amex might affect contracting behavior. Although
on its facts Amex involves the enforceability of an arbitral class
waiver, the Court's reasoning might extend as well to nonarbitral
class waivers, at least as to certain federal statutory claims. There
are, however, important differences between arbitral and nonarbitral
class waivers that might affect firm behavior. Unlike arbitral class
waivers, nonarbitral class waivers likely remain subject to state
unconscionability challenges. That is because Concepcion is based on
the FAA and therefore is limited to arbitral class waivers. But for
businesses that want to avoid the bundling costs of arbitration (e.g.,
retain the right to appeal in court), nonarbitral class waivers would
become more attractive after Amex. Thus, for a firm that favored the
most airtight class waiver, an arbitral class waiver might make sense;
for a firm that favored a greater opportunity to appeal an adverse
decision, a nonarbitral class waiver might make more sense.
Fourth, this Article clarifies the nature of arbitration as a
means of resolving disputes. An arbitration clause is an agreement to
a bundle of dispute resolution services-a party-appointed judge, less
discovery, a limited right to appeal, and the like. Litigation provides
its own bundle of services. And while parties can modify the litigation
and arbitration bundles by contract, there are limits. For some
parties, all aspects of the arbitral bundle may be preferable to all
aspects of the litigation bundle. For others, some arbitral
characteristics may be advantageous while others are not, but the
advantages may outweigh the disadvantages. For still others, the
disadvantages of arbitration may outweigh the advantages-even if
one of those advantages is avoiding class actions. Stated otherwise,
one cannot assume that parties will choose arbitration on the basis of
only one characteristic without considering the entire bundle.
Fifth and finally, this Article provides insights into the nature
of contract change and innovation. Specifically, it draws on prior
scholars' work about why, under certain circumstances, contract terms
might be sticky. We examine several explanations for why contract
terms might be sticky and consider how those explanations apply
when the contracts involve parties occupying unequal bargaining
positions. There certainly is reason to expect a degree of stickiness in
franchise agreements, and we indeed find some evidence of stickiness
in the contracts we studied. But the evidence does not exclude the
possibility of other explanations for the lack of a shift to arbitration by
franchisors, such as the bundling theory suggested above. This Article
also gives reason to question whether a Supreme Court decision
964 [Vol. 67:4:955
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upholding a particular contract provision necessarily is a sufficient
"shock" to overcome contract stickiness.
Part II of the Article provides background on the use of
arbitration clauses as class action waivers, as well as on the
Concepcion and Amex decisions. Part III discusses the economics of
arbitration and standard form contracts, considering both the bundle
of dispute resolution services provided in arbitration and the
"stickiness" of contract terms. Part IV describes our data and
methodology, and presents our empirical analysis. Part V examines
Amex's possible implications for the use of arbitral and nonarbitral
class waivers. Finally, Part VI summarizes our conclusions and sets
out the implications of our empirical findings.
II. CoNcEPcIoN, AMEX, AND THE USE OF
ARBITRATION CLAUSES
We begin with terminology and some history. Although many
of the cases and much of the commentary speak generically of "class
action waivers," we use more precise labels. Technically, provisions
addressing class relief in arbitration clauses are class arbitration
waivers, not class action waivers. 25 The arbitration clause itself has
the effect of avoiding class relief in court because the parties instead
have agreed to arbitrate any dispute. 26 The additional waiver
language precludes the arbitration from proceeding on a class basis,
hence the term "class arbitration waiver."
In this Article, we refer to the combined effect of an arbitration
clause and a class arbitration waiver as an "arbitral class waiver."27
By comparison, we use the term "nonarbitral class waiver" to refer to
contract provisions designed to waive the availability of a class action
in court without using an arbitration clause. Nonarbitral class waivers
25. Although sometimes an arbitration agreement will include a nonarbitral class waiver
in the event the arbitration clause is invalidated. See David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke
Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 29-30), available at
http://perma.cclP84G-PGYE.
26. See, e.g., Zawikowski v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, No. 98 C 2178, 1999 WL 35304, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1999) ("Nothing prevents the Plaintiffs from contracting away their right to a
class action." (citation omitted)); Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 690, 694 (M.D. Ga.
1997); Hunt v. Up North Plastics, 980 F. Supp. 1046, 1048 (D. Minn. 1997) (granting the
defendant's motion to compel arbitration); Ex Parte Green Tree Fin. Corp., 723 So. 2d 6, 10 n.3
(Ala. 1998) ("[A] rule of civil procedure providing for class actions cannot overcome binding
arbitration agreements.").
27. For examples of prior uses of the phrase, see Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class
Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 767, 786 (2012) (referring to a clause as an
"arbitral class waiver"); see also Sternlight, supra note 6 ("arbitral class action waiver").
2014] 965
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:4:955
are much less common but do exist, particularly in the franchise
setting.28 Finally, we refer to both types of provisions collectively as
class action waivers. 29
Because the history of arbitral class waivers has been detailed
at length elsewhere, 30 we provide only a brief overview here. We
reiterate the highlights of the events leading up to Concepcion in
Section II.A and then discuss Concepcion itself in Section II.B. Finally,
in Section II.C, we consider the Amex case and its importance for the
enforceability of class action waivers.
A. Arbitration Clauses and Class Actions
Franchise lawyers were among the very first to recognize that
an arbitration clause could reduce their clients' risks of facing class
actions.31 In a 1997 article in the Franchise Law Journal, attorney
28. See infra text accompanying notes 198-99.
29. Gilles uses the term "collective action waiver" to the same effect. Gilles, supra note 14,
at 375-76; see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Franchising, Arbitration,
and the Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 276, 270-80 (2009) (explaining
different usages).
30. See, e.g., Jill I. Gross, AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42
Sw. L. REV. 47, 51-56 (2012); Sternlight, supra note 15, at 705-07; Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 53-78 (2000).
31. For other early publications making the same point, see Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J.
Levin, Excuse Me, but Who's the Predator? Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, 7
BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 1998, at 24, 26 ("Arbitration is a powerful deterrent to class action
lawsuits against lenders because the great weight of authority holds that arbitrations cannot be
conducted on a class basis unless the parties have agreed to do so."); Michael R. Pennington,
Every Health Insurer's Litigation Nightmare: A Case Study of How One Class Action Affected the
Business of One Health Insurer, 28 BRIEF 46, 52 (1999) ("In a further effort to limit litigation
exposure in general, and exposure to class actions in particular, many insurance companies in
Alabama are presently working to sustain the use of arbitration clauses in insurance policies.");
J.T. Westermeir, How Arbitration Clauses Can Help Avoid Class Action Damages: Strategies for
Managing Risks of Litigation, 14 COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST, Sept. 1997, at 1, 1. Kaplinsky
describes himself as the "pioneer of class action waivers." Mickey Meece, Arbitration Is Here to
Stay and One Lawyer Says That Is Good for Consumers, http://perma.cc/TLR8-V63P (forbes.com,
archived Mar. 10, 2014).
Reported case law reveals a variety of class action risks faced by franchisors. For a
sampling, see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 1 (1984) (common-law and disclosure
claims under state franchise law); Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 729 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 2013)
(common-law claims and violations of state wage and labor laws); Fantastic Sams Franchise
Corp. v. FSRO Ass'n Ltd., 683 F.3d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 2012) (breach of licensing agreements);
Klosek v. Am. Express Co., 370 Fed. App'x 761, 762 (8th Cir. 2010) (common-law claims);
Bridgefund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2010)
(common-law claims and violations of state franchise-investment law); see also infra note 59
(collecting post-Concepcion cases where class waivers are challenged in franchise agreements).
We are grateful to Bob Scott for highlighting the importance of this proposition to our argument.
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Jack Dunham explained that franchisors faced a heightened risk of
class actions and concluded that "franchisors with an arbitration
clause in their franchise agreements have an effective tool for
managing these new class action risks."32 The arbitration clause,
according to Dunham, served as a "class action shield."33
At the time, many courts refused to order arbitration to
proceed on a class basis. The arbitration clause itself thus "shield[ed]"
franchisors from class actions. 34 Even so, some franchisors (and other
businesses) began coupling their arbitration clauses with provisions
precluding arbitration from proceeding on a class basis.35 These class
arbitration waivers became more important after the Supreme Court's
2003 decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.36 The issue in
Bazzle was whether the FAA preempted the South Carolina Supreme
Court's decision compelling class arbitration. 7 The U.S. Supreme
Court was sharply divided, with the plurality concluding that the
issue of whether an arbitration clause permitted class arbitration was
for the arbitrator to decide. 38
In response to Bazzle, the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") promulgated rules for administering class arbitrations.39 The
32. Dunham, supra note 17, at 141.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Iowa Grain Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
class action was unavailable because arbitration is an agreement between the parties); Champ v.
Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-77 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[The FAA forbids federal judges from
ordering class arbitration where the parties' arbitration agreement is silent on the matter."). But
see Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 613 (1982) (granting deference to the trial court to
consider a class-wide arbitration as it would a motion for class certification), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (S.C. 2002) ("[C]lass-wide arbitration may be ordered when the
arbitration agreement is silent if it would serve efficiency and equity, and would not result in
prejudice."), vacated, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
35. See Drahozal, supra note 20, at 731-32.
36. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). It is not just parties or commentators that make empirical
predictions. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S.
444 (2003) (No. 02-634), 2003 WL 1989562, at *53 ("Does this case have any real future
significance, because isn't it fairly clear that all the arbitration agreements in the future will
prohibit class actions?').
37. 539 U.S. at 447 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion). A companion case involved a decision by
the arbitrator that arbitration could proceed on a class basis. Id. at 453-54 (Breyer, J., plurality
opinion).
38. Id. at 452-53 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment
vacating the South Carolina court's decision so that there would at least be a judgment of the
Court. Id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
39. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, http://perma.cc
3QBG-RQGP (adr.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014). JAMS has also promulgated class arbitration
rules. See JAMS, JAMS Class Action Procedures, http://perma.cc/MZ5T-U37S (jamsadr.com,
archived Mar. 10, 2014).
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AAA indicated that it would administer a class arbitration as long as
the parties had agreed to arbitrate under any set of AAA rules and the
arbitration agreement was "silent" on class arbitration, consolidation,
or joinder.40 Following the Bazzle plurality, the AAA class arbitration
rules specified that the arbitrator was to decide in a "clause
construction award" "whether the applicable arbitration clause
permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class."4 '
The arbitration proceedings would then be stayed to permit any party
to seek court review of the clause construction award. Assuming the
arbitrator construed the agreement as permitting class arbitration,
subsequent steps in the process track Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 on class actions (i.e., the arbitrator would decide whether to certify
a class 42 and then would proceed to adjudicate the merits).43 Since
promulgating its rules, the AAA has administered over 350 class
arbitration proceedings. 44
In only a handful of AAA clause construction awards (7 of 135,
or 5%) did the arbitrators decide that the arbitration clause did not
permit class arbitration.45 In the vast majority, the arbitrators
construed the clause as permitting class arbitration (95 of 135, or
70%), or the parties stipulated that it did so (33 of 135, or 24%).46
Seeking to avoid class arbitration, businesses increasingly included
class arbitration waivers in their contracts. 47 In turn, consumers,
employees, and franchisees challenged the enforceability of those class
arbitration waivers, most commonly (although not exclusively) on the
ground that the class arbitration waiver was unconscionable.48
40. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, http://perma.cc/HN5R-Q7TX
(adr.org, archived Mar. 10, 2014):
[T]he American Arbitration Association will administer demands for class arbitration
pursuant to its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations if (1) the underlying
agreement specifies that disputes arising out of the parties' agreement shall be
resolved by arbitration in accordance with any of the Association's rules, and (2) the
agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims.
41. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 39, R. 3.
42. Id. R. 4-5.
43. Id. R. 7-8.
44. See Gregory A. Litt & Tina Praprotnik, After Stolt-Nielsen, Circuits Split, but AAA
Filings Continue, 27 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 1, 1 (2012) (charting AAA class arbitrations filed
between 2003 and 2012).
45. Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party
at 22, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
46. Id.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 147-48.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 50-54. In addition, arbitration clauses also were
challenged on the ground that they precluded the claimant from vindicating his or her statutory
rights. See infra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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Businesses responded by arguing that the FAA, preempted that
argument. The issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.49
B. Concepcion and FAA Preemption
The Concepcions were cell phone customers of AT&T Mobility
("AT&T") who were charged sales tax on what AT&T advertised as a
"free" phone.50 The AT&T cell phone agreement included an
arbitration clause with a class arbitration waiver but also provided
that AT&T was to pay all the customer's arbitration costs for
nonfrivolous claims; AT&T could not seek to recover its attorney's fees
from the customer; and if the customer recovered more in arbitration
than AT&T's final written settlement offer, the customer would
receive a minimum of $7,500 (a so-called bonus payment) plus double
attorneys' fees. 5 1
When the Concepcions filed a class action on behalf of all
similarly situated cell phone customers, AT&T filed a petition to
compel arbitration. The trial court and the Ninth Circuit held that,
under California law, the class arbitration waiver was unconscionable
and not severable from the rest of the arbitration clause.52 The lower
courts also concluded that the FAA did not preempt California's
application of its unconscionability doctrine. 53
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FAA preempted
state court decisions invalidating arbitral class waivers as
unconscionable. Applying state unconscionability doctrine so as
effectively to require class arbitration, the Court concluded,
"[i]nterfered with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."64
49. 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). Some of the groundwork for the Court's decision in
Concepcion was laid by Stolt-Nielsen, in which the Court vacated a class arbitration award on
the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their powers. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012)
(permitting vacatur of arbitral award when arbitrators exceed their powers).
50. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
51. Id.
52. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), affd sub. nom., Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir.
2009), rev'd sub nom., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
53. E.g., Laster, 584 F.3d at 857-59.
54. AT&T Mobility LLC., 131 S. Ct. at 1748. According to the Court, class arbitration is
"inconsistent with the FAA" because (1) "the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices
the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality-and makes the process slower, more
costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment"; (2) "class
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The decision in Concepcion has been extremely controversial
and widely criticized.55 Although a handful of courts have sought to
limit the decision to its facts-in other words, to arbitration clauses
with a bonus provision and other sorts of pro-consumer provisions that
the AT&T clause had56-most have not done so. 5 7 On the first
anniversary of Concepcion in April 2012, Public Citizen "reported that
76 court decisions had applied Concepcion to stay or dismiss a
putative class action."58 Courts have applied Concepcion to uphold
arbitral class waivers in a variety of contracting contexts, including
franchise agreements.59
After Concepcion, plaintiffs continued to challenge arbitral
class waivers on the ground that the lack of class relief precluded the
plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory rights (so-called
effective-vindication challenges). Building on dicta in a number of
Supreme Court arbitration cases, plaintiffs argued that arbitral class
waivers amounted to impermissible prospective waivers of statutory
rights and hence were unenforceable.60 If parties cannot waive a
arbitration requires procedural formality"; and (3) "class arbitration greatly increases risks to
defendants." Id. at 1751-52.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 2-8.
56. See, e.g., Feeney v. Dell Inc., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 652, at *8 (Super. Ct. 2011)
(distinguishing Concepcion on ground that, unlike the AT&T Mobility clause in Concepcion,
"[t]he Dell Arbitration Clause provides no incentives and simply requires arbitration of all
disputes, even those that could not possibly justify the expense in light of the amount in
controversy"), rev'd, 993 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 2013).
57. See, e.g., Bellows v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 09CV1951, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48237, at *11 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2011) (applying Concepcion even when arbitration clause did not
include "bonus provision"); Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, No. 8:10-CV-2463-T-33TGW, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49231, at *15-16 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2011) (same); Zarandi v. Alliance Data Sys.
Corp., No. CV10-8309DSF(JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54602, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2011)
(same).
58. CHRISTINE HINES ET AL., JUSTICE DENIED ONE YEAR LATER: THE HARMS TO CONSUMERS
FROM THE SUPREME COURT'S CONCEPCION DECISION ARE PLAINLY EVIDENT 4 (2014), available at
http://perma.cc/5WQ5-KL6K ("identify[ing] 76 potential class action cases where judges cited
Concepcion and held that class action bans within arbitration clauses were enforceable").
59. See, e.g., Muriithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc., 712 F.3d 173, 180-81 (4th Cir. 2013)
(upholding the validity of an arbitral class waiver in a franchise agreement); Green v.
SuperShuttle Int'l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Kairy v. SuperShuttle Intl,
Inc., No. C08-02993JSW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134945, at *10, *21-23 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20,
2012) (same); Villano v. TD Bank, No. 11-CV-6714, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123013, at *8 (D.N.J.
Aug. 29, 2012) (same).
60. E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U. S. 79, 89-90 (2000) ("It may well
be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant .. . from effectively
vindicating her federal statutory rights . . .. "); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) ("And so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue
to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.").
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statutory right directly, 61 they should not be able to do so indirectly by
using an unfair arbitration clause. A common basis for an effective-
vindication challenge is that that the up-front costs of arbitration are
too high.62 But that challenge has been made against other provisions
in arbitration clauses as well, and after Concepcion, it became the
primary basis for challenging arbitral class waivers.
C. Amex and the Effective Vindication of Federal Statutory Rights
The effective-vindication theory-as applied to arbitral class
waivers-reached the Supreme Court in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant.63 The plaintiffs in Amex were merchants
that accepted American Express charge cards. They brought a class
action alleging that American Express's sales and pricing practices
violated federal antitrust law. American Express's standard form
merchant agreement included an arbitration clause with a class
arbitration waiver, and American Express sought to compel individual
arbitration of the merchants' claims. The merchants opposed
individual arbitration on the ground that proof of the antitrust claim
was so expensive that the claim could only be brought economically as
a class action. Enforcing the arbitral class waiver would prevent them
from effectively vindicating their statutory rights under the antitrust
laws.
The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration, but
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the class arbitration waiver
was unenforceable. 64 After reconsidering its decision in light of both
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. and Concepcion,
the Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision. 65 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.66
The Court's reasoning was twofold. First, the Court recited that
the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration clauses, and it found "[n]o
contrary congressional command [that] requires us to reject the
waiver of class arbitration here."67 Nothing in the antitrust laws
61. By a "direct" waiver of a statutory right, we mean a contract provision that says
something like "the parties agree to waive any claim under the federal antitrust laws."
62. E.g., Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90.
63. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309-10 (2013).
64. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F. 3d 300, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2009).
65. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012), rev'd sub nom. Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013); In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634
F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 2011), rev'd sub nom. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d at 219-20.
66. Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2312.
67. Id. at 2309.
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(which, the Court pointed out, were enacted before adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) precludes the waiver of class actions.
"Nor does congressional approval of Rule 23," the Court stated,
"establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of
statutory rights."68
Second, the Court noted that it had only recognized the
effective-vindication doctrine in dicta. But even assuming that the
argument was available, the Court found it unavailing:
mhe exception finds its origin in the desire to prevent "prospective waiver of a
party's right to pursue statutory remedies." That would certainly cover a provision in an
arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights. And it would
perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as
to make access to the forum impracticable. The class-action waiver merely limits
arbitration to the two contracting parties. It no more eliminates those parties' right to
pursue their statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action
for legal relief in 1938. Or, to put it differently, the individual suit that was considered
adequate to assure "effective vindication" of a federal right before adoption of class-
action procedures did not suddenly become "ineffective vindication" upon their
adoption.69
By rejecting the effective-vindication challenge, Amex resolved
much of the remaining legal uncertainty over the enforceability of
arbitral class waivers, at least pending future statutory or regulatory
developments. 70 We discuss possible implications of the decision for
nonarbitral class waivers below.7 '
III. BUNDLED DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND STICKY CONTRACTS
Predictions that most or all businesses will begin using
arbitration clauses after Concepcion and Amex depend on two key
assumptions: (1) that there is no reason for businesses not to use
arbitration clauses, and (2) that businesses can and do readily change
their standard form contracts in response to favorable court
decisions.72 In this Part, we evaluate those assumptions by examining
both the bundle of dispute resolution services that arbitration provides
and the stickiness of contract terms.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2310-11.
70. Congress might enact legislation restricting the enforceability of arbitral class waivers,
although the prospects of any statutory change are slight. In addition, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau has authority to regulate arbitration clauses in consumer financial-services
contracts under section 1028(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, after it completes its statutorily mandated study. See 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
71. See infra Part V.A.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15,
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A. The Decision Whether to Use an Arbitral Class Waiver: Arbitration
as a Bundle of Dispute Resolution Services and the Risk of
Class Actions
The first assumption is that there is no reason for a business
not to switch to an arbitration clause. Businesses want to avoid class
actions, and they can do so at essentially no cost by using an arbitral
class waiver. On this view, in other words, the only meaningful
consequence of using an arbitral class waiver is getting rid of class
actions.
But an arbitration clause does more than simply reduce the
risk of class actions; it removes the case altogether from a judicial
forum. By using an arbitration clause, parties agree to use a bundle of
dispute resolution services-a bundle that includes avoiding class
actions but has other features as well.73 These features range from
decisionmakers selected by the parties and procedures paid for by the
parties to, importantly, a very limited appeals process.74
For franchisors, the lack of an appeals process is a very serious
cost of using an arbitration clause-and an arbitral class waiver. 75 As
franchise lawyer Martin Fern explains:
There has long been a debate among lawyers regarding the pros and cons of arbitration
in general and in the franchise context in particular. The principal advantages of
arbitration include informality, lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability
to choose expert arbitrators to resolve specialized disputes. The principal disadvantage
73. See, e.g., Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 29, at 300 (explaining that "arbitration
clauses bundle a variety of characteristics-including but not limited to acting as a class action
waiver-into a single means of dispute resolution. Not all drafting parties will agree to
arbitration, even if they might prefer individual arbitrations to class actions.").
74. Drahozal & O'Hara O'Connor, supra note 19. In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576, 577 (2008), the Supreme Court held that parties could not, by agreement, expand
the grounds under section 10 of the FAA for judicial review of arbitral awards. The Court left
open the possibility that such agreements might be enforceable in state court under state
arbitration laws, and a few states such as California and Texas have enforced these sorts of
agreements. See, e.g., NAFTA Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 101 (Tex. 2011) (relying on
Hall St. Assocs. to say the FAA does not preempt enforcement of agreements for expanded
judicial review of arbitration awards); Cable Connection Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 599
(Cal. 2008) (explaining that the California Arbitration Act's provision for the enforcement of
agreements for merits review is consistent with the FAA policy guaranteeing the enforcement of
private contractual agreements and that the FAA does not require state law to conform with its
limitations).
75. Arguably, such costs are another cost of Concepcion, although alternatively, one might
characterize them as costs of court decisions refusing to enforce nonarbitral class waivers-
which result in parties having to choose instead the less efficient arbitral class waiver. See
Drahozal & O'Hara O'Connor, supra note 19 (explaining that use of class waivers to avoid class
actions imposes additional costs on parties that are separate from any benefits or costs of
eliminating class relief).
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of arbitration is the absence of the availability of multi-layered appeal which can
normally be filed to rectify erroneous court decisions, but not arbitration awards. In
other words, in arbitration, the principal tradeoff against the many advantages is the
inability of the losing party to correct erroneous decisions by the arbitrator.76
This cost gives franchisors a very good reason not to use an arbitration
clause, which at least reduces, if not offsets entirely, any benefit from
avoiding class actions.77
By comparison, a nonarbitral class waiver avoids the bundling
costs of an arbitral class waiver. A party that prefers to have disputes
resolved in court can do so while still avoiding class actions if it uses a
clause that affects only the availability of class actions.78 The parties
still can use public court judges, take advantage of the government
subsidy to courts, and appeal on much broader grounds than if their
contract contained an arbitral class waiver. And while nonarbitral
class waivers are much less common than arbitral class waivers, they
do exist.79
Using a nonarbitral class waiver, however, poses greater risks
of court invalidation. After Concepcion, the FAA provides a
substantial degree of protection for arbitral class waivers; nonarbitral
class waivers have no such federal law backing. As a result, a number
of courts-although certainly not all-have refused to enforce
nonarbitral class waivers.80 We discuss the possibility in Part V that
76. Fern, supra note 16. Franchisors can mitigate some of the costs of an arbitral class
waiver by using carve-outs, excluding claims for which arbitration is particularly ill-suited from
arbitration such that the claims will be resolved instead in court. Drahozal & O'Hara O'Connor,
supra note 19. But using carve-outs has its own costs. See id. (explaining that parties incur
drafting costs to include carve-outs when they must specify courts in which relief for particular
claims is to be sought).
77. We acknowledge here the self-evident point that the consequences of bundling cut both
ways. The limited appellate right also affects the franchisees' ability to appeal an adverse award.
We do not attempt to disaggregate the actual impact of the incidence of the limited appellate
right. Rather, our more modest goal is to identify an explanation for why a certain set of
franchisors might prefer not to use arbitration clauses despite the appeal of the class waiver. We
thank participants in the Columbia University Law School workshop on the Law and Economics
of Contracting for their observations on this point.
78. Assuming, of course, that a court will enforce the nonarbitral class waiver. See infra
text accompanying notes 139-48.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 198-99.
80. See In re Yahoo! Litig., 251 F.R.D. 459, 469-70 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (refusing to hold
nonarbitral class waiver enforceable as a matter of law in commercial case and denying motion
for summary judgment pending "more developed evidentiary record"); cf. Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552
F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (refusing to enforce forum-selection clause when
forum selected does not permit class actions); Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr.
2d 699, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same); Am. Online, Inc. v. Pasieka, 870 So. 2d 170, 171-72 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Dix v. ICT Grp., Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1024 (Wash. 2007) (same).
Compare Martrano v. Quizno's Franchise Co., No. 08-0932, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52025, at *87
(W.D. Pa. June 15, 2009) (invalidating nonarbitral class waiver), and Elhilu v. Quizno's
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Amex might make nonarbitral class waivers more enforceable. If so,
nonarbitral class waivers would become more attractive, at least for
those businesses that have other reasons for not using arbitration
clauses.
We are not suggesting that all franchisors will avoid
arbitration because of the limited right to appeal (or other bundling
costs of arbitration). But the limited availability of appeals from
arbitration awards certainly is a consideration on the margin. Nor is
the limited right to appeal the only reason why a business might not
use arbitration. Other possible reasons include less effective interim
measures, the lack of summary adjudication, inefficiencies in
collection cases, and added uncertainty in the application of otherwise-
certain legal remedies.81 Instead, our point is simply that, because of
the bundled nature of arbitration, there are costs to using an arbitral
class waiver, and these costs provide a reason for some businesses not
to use an arbitral class waiver even after Concepcion and Amex. 8 2
At the same time, not all businesses are equally susceptible to
class actions. As one illustration, a study by the Searle Civil Justice
Institute found that, while all of the credit card issuers and cell phone
companies in a sample of AAA consumer arbitrations included class
arbitration waivers in their arbitration clauses, none of the real estate
Franchising Co., No. 2:06-cv-07855-FMC-CTx, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109435, at *15 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 3, 2008) (same), with Bonanno v. Quizno's Franchise Co., No. 06-cv-02358-CMA-KLM, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37702, at *69 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009) (enforcing nonarbitral class waiver). But
cf. Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (D. Md. 2000) (concluding that
unavailability of class actions in chosen forum is no reason to refuse to enforce forum-selection
clause) Forrest v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1012 (D.C. 2002)(same); Am. Online,
Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam) (same); Gilman v.
Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 464-65 (Md. 1997) (same).
81. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 433, 453-57 (2010). This latter point is
exacerbated by, but not coextensive with, the limited right to appeal.
82. Reputational constraints provide another possible reason businesses might not use
arbitration clauses with class arbitration waivers, even after Concepcion and Amex. See Gregory
C. Cook, Why American Express v. Italian Colors Does Not Matter and Coordinated Pursuit of
Aggregate Claims May Be a Viable Option After Concepcion, 2 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 104A, 109
(2013):
It is also a mistake to assert that corporate America will uniformly modify contracts to
include arbitration. Making changes to an existing contract is not simple or costless.
Corporate defendants make such changes cautiously and the marketplace can be a
discipline on contract changes. In other words, corporations may decide not to include
an arbitration clause for marketing reasons or may decide not to amend their
contracts because amendment may have a marketing impact.
Brownell, supra note 13 ("If the court does indeed rule in favor of American Express, look for
even more businesses to find ways to shield themselves from lawsuits. 'Companies would only be
restrained either by their own good conscience, or by their fear that consumers would get mad,'
says [Jean] Sternlight.").
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brokerage firms did.83 Presumably real estate brokerages are less
subject to class actions than mass contracting firms like credit card
issuers and cell phone companies, and so have less incentive to include
a class arbitration waiver.
The same is true even among businesses that use mass
contracts. Our previous research on the use of arbitration clauses in
credit card agreements (prior to Concepcion) predicted that, while "on
the margin, issuers likely will respond to Concepcion . . . by increasing
their use of arbitration clauses," "the significance of other factors in
explaining the use of arbitration clauses" suggests that "predictions
that all issuers will begin using arbitration clauses are
unsupported."84 Other explanatory factors included the riskiness of
the issuer's credit card portfolio, the size of the issuer, whether the
issuer specialized in credit card loans, and whether the issuer was
mutually owned (i.e., was a credit union).85
When potential bundling costs of arbitral class waivers are
taken together with the relatively low risk of class actions some
businesses face, it is plausible that some businesses might rationally
decide not to use an arbitral class waiver in their standard form
contracts. At the very least, this reasoning provides a theoretical
explanation for the possibility that not all businesses will switch to
arbitration after Concepcion and thus presents an empirically testable
proposition.
B. Arbitration Clauses and Sticky Contracts
The second assumption underlying predictions of a widespread
switch to arbitration after Concepcion is that businesses can-and
do-quickly and readily amend their form contracts in response to
court decisions. Here we consider the possibility that this assumption
might not hold. In other words, we examine whether contract terms
might be sticky.
The notion of sticky contract terms is hardly new. Numerous
scholars have examined why parties may be reluctant to alter contract
83. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REv. 289, 349-50 (2011) (publishing results from Searle Civil Justice
Institute's March 2009 Preliminary Report).
84. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 24, at 540. Various considerations, such as the size of
the issuer and the riskiness of the issuer's credit card portfolio, in addition to the enforceability
of class arbitration waivers, were important in explaining an issuer's use of an arbitration
clause. Id.
85. Id. at 559.
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terms, even when the law might (or clearly does) allow alterations
that would benefit the parties. This Section reviews that literature
and examines how it bears on the contracting practice relevant here-
namely, standard form contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. We find that several of the traditional explanations for the
stickiness of contract terms likely do not apply in this particular
context. We try, therefore, to isolate the likeliest explanations. From
there, we generate hypotheses in order to ascertain whether (and why)
franchisors do not always adapt their contract terms to the extent
permitted or encouraged by Supreme Court decisions.
1. Possible Explanations for Contract Stickiness
We do not write on a blank slate. Contracts scholars have
offered various explanations for the possible stickiness of contract
terms, and some have provided helpful syntheses of existing
explanations.86 The literature reveals at least eleven different
explanations. These include (1) endowment effects, (2) satisficing, (3)
negative signaling, (4) interpretive risk, (5) overhang, (6) herd effects,(7) contract routines, (8) uncertainty, (9) free riders, (10) learning
externalities, and (11) network externalities. All of these theories,
moreover, are assessed against the null hypothesis that contracts are
not sticky. This section explains why several of these theories seem
unlikely to apply in the adhesive setting, briefly summarizes the
remaining theories, and then introduces the null hypothesis.
The first three theories-endowment effects,87 satisficing,88 and
negative signaling89-do not have much explanatory value in the
86. For especially helpful syntheses, see MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. ScoTT, THE THREE AND
A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 33-44 (2013);
Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
651, 655-60 (2006). For other scholarship on the topic, not cited below, see Stephen J. Choi & G.
Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1158 (2006) (discussing reasons why
sticky contract terms exist); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How
Contract Terms Do (and Do Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 655, 658-60 (2007)
(discussing arbitration contract stickiness as a possible reason for why certain clauses include
one-sided terms and conflicting providers rules); Gus De Franco et al., Sticky Covenants 1-3
(Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-61, Rotman School of Management Working Paper No.
2288723, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/9XFJ-UG94 (analyzing the stickiness of bond-
covenant restrictiveness). See also the articles published by the N.YU. Law Review from a
Conference on Contractual Innovation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1-285 (2013).
87. The theory of "endowment effects" postulates that individuals "often place a higher
value on retaining the goods that they already possess (their endowments)." See Russell
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625 (1998);
Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of
Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1584 (1998) (discussing how the initial
2014] 977
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:4:955
franchise context. Each of these theories rests on a premise about the
behavior of the party in the weaker bargaining position that would not
appear to be valid with franchise contracts. The endowment effect, for
example, presupposes that the other party attaches a value to a
contract term in excess of its actual market value (an unlikely
proposition when a party cannot dicker over the terms). Likewise,
both satisficing and negative signaling rest on the assumption that
the parties are actively dickering over the terms of the contract.
Consequently, these theories appear unlikely to explain stickiness of
franchise contracts, 90 and we do not explore them further.
The remaining eight theories (as well as the null hypothesis),
however, might have some explanatory value. Unlike the three just
discarded, these theories depend on the incentives of a single
contracting party, even when that party occupies a far superior
bargaining position. We briefly review the broad contours of these
theories.
Interpretive risk. Contracts scholarship tends to conceptualize
transactional lawyering as a process of identifying and addressing risk
allocation of legal entitlements can affect preference). It might, of course, be the case that
endowment effects work in the opposite direction. That is, the franchisor (or, more abstractly, the
party in the superior bargaining position) attaches significance to the chosen form of dispute
resolution even where, as a matter of rational-choice theory, another option would be in the
franchisor's interest.
88. The theory of satisficing argues that any individual party has an outcome (or set of
outcomes) that would be optimal from the party's individual perspective, but achieving that
optimal outcome may be especially (perhaps prohibitively) costly. See Patrick Bolton & Antoine
Faure-Grimaud, Satisficing Contracts, 77 REV. EcON. STUD. 937, 938 (2010) (discussing how
agents write satisficing contracts that do not fully exploit all gains from trade that would be
available if they faced no deliberation costs).
89. This theory postulates that contracting parties are reluctant to propose changes to
contract terms because such proposals might convey information to their contract partner. See
Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 86, at 651-52 (discussing how parties will not draft out of
default contract provisions even when better alternatives exist because they fear what it will
signal to their contracting partner); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 616 (1990) (discussing "penalty"
default rules, where the default contract rules force a party to reveal information they may not
wish to reveal to their contracting partner); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure
of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 136 (1956).
90. There may be exceptions. In some cases, well-organized associations represent groups
of franchisees in their relations with franchisors. Under those circumstances, the parties may
have relatively more equal bargaining positions, and some of the explanations for sticky
contracts (such as negative signaling) might have more resonance. We thank Victor Goldberg for
his observations on this point. Moreover, changes may be subject to regulatory oversight. Even if
the franchisor does not need to dicker with the franchisee, it may incur costs placating a
regulator.
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through the design of appropriate contract terms.91 Interpretive risk is
premised on the idea that the counterparty to a transaction will resist
changes from preferred language in an industry norm.92 Like
endowment effects, the notion of interpretive risk assumes that the
counterparty prefers familiar contract language to unfamiliar
language. Unlike endowment effects, though, the preference stems not
from some irrational attachment to the familiar but from the relative
lower uncertainty that attaches to using a term with an accepted
meaning in the industry.
Overhang. Overhang bears a close relationship to interpretive
risk. It reflects a belief that changes in contract terms will affect the
interpretation of prior contracts. For example, suppose that a contract
term X is generally understood to mean that risk passes to the buyer
once the relevant goods are loaded onto the ship. Suppose further that
a court later interprets X to mean that the risk passes to the buyer
only after the goods reach their port of destination. In reaction to this
judicial decision, the seller considers changing its contracts to replace
term X with term Y Term Y somehow makes clearer that risk passes
to the buyer at the earlier point in the shipment. The buyer proposing
the inclusion of term Y might imply that preexisting contracts (all of
which use term X) were understood by the seller, as drafted, to reflect
the judicial interpretation.9 3 Ideas of overhang thus are especially
salient in industries that involve high volumes of contracting whereby
subtle changes in new contracts could have significant impact on the
interpretation of a large number of preexisting contracts. 94 In
situations of overhang, as opposed to interpretive risk, the concerns
over interpretation stem from the party contemplating the change, as
opposed to the party to whom the change is proposed.
Herd effects. Closely related to the idea of interpretive risk and
overhang is the concept of herd effects. This notion stems from the
insights of psychological research suggesting that certain individuals
91. See Weidemaier, supra note 86, at 661, 674 (discussing arbitration providers as
suppliers of risk management).
92. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rule Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
59, 71-72 (1993) (discussing how changes from default rules can lead to transaction
breakdowns).
93. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2006) (discussing how insurers retain language that is unclear to
policyholders as long as it has become clear to the courts, even if the court's interpretation is
different from the insurer's original intended meaning).
94. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
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tend to be risk averse.95 Translated into the context of contracting
practices, the idea of herd effects suggests that lawyers, particularly
in-house counsel, engage in risk-averse behavior by repeating what
their predecessors have done. 96 In doing so, lawyers reduce the
likelihood that they will be blamed for proposed changes that prove
contrary to the client's interests. Innovation isolates the
entrepreneurial lawyer from the herd and thus makes him peculiarly
vulnerable to blame. Consequently, contract terms remain sticky-not
because of the costs to the firm (such as with overhang or endowment
effects) but instead due to agency problems stemming from the
lawyer's selfish incentives.
Contract routines. Mitu Gulati and Robert Scott systematically
articulate the concept of contract routines. 97 This idea begins from the
premise that agents, such as lawyers, are working within a complex
set of contractual structures. No single agent may fully understand
the relationship between a particular contract provision and the larger
contractual or commercial structure. Consequently, they are reluctant
to change a particular term for fear of unwittingly upsetting other
contractual provisions that may, unbeknownst to the lawyer, have
some actual (or potential) relationship to the particular term. Like the
notion of herding, the idea of contract routines roots the explanation
in the incentives of the firm's agent. But unlike herding, the agency
problem lies not in blame avoidance but instead in a simple reaction to
uncertainty over a complex model and a desire to avoid unintended
costs to the firm.
Uncertainty. Gulati and Scott also suggest that contract
stickiness may be attributable to simple uncertainty.98 Boilerplate
contracts may have been drafted with a particular allocation of risk in
mind. As time passes, the original drafter's intentions are forgotten as
the drafters themselves move on. So the successors at the firm inherit
the clauses without the understanding behind them. Successors are
reluctant to change the clauses not for fear of blame (as with herding).
Rather, they simply do not know the consequences of the change.
Therefore, they "leave well enough alone" and do not question the
continued use of a contract clause. The theory closely resembles that
of contract routines with one critical difference: the account grounded
95. GUILATI & ScoTT, supra note 86, at 39; see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 354-55 (1996) (discussing risk aversion in lawyers).
96. GULATI & ScoI'r, supra note 86, at 39, 197 n.23.
97. Id. at 38-39.
98. Id. at 42-43.
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in uncertainty focuses on the passage of time and the consequent loss
of personnel who can explain the background risk allocation behind a
boilerplate term.
Free riders. Free riding traces to Mancur Olson's idea of
collective action problems. 9 Firms would prefer not to undertake the
cost and investment of innovation if another firm will undertake that
cost first. If a competing firm does so, then the free-riding firm can
take advantage of whatever benefits accrue from the innovation
without having to bear the cost itself. In the contracting context, the
theory of free riders would explain stickiness on the ground that firms
are unwilling to themselves assume the costs of contract innovation.
Instead, they wait for another firm to do so. They then wait and see
how that other firm's innovation holds up in court. If the new term is
interpreted in a manner favorable to the firm, then other firms will
employ the new formulation as well.
Learning externalities. Pioneered by Marcel Kahan and
Michael Klausner, the theory of learning externalities (sometimes
referred to as "learning effects" or "learning benefits") explains
contract-term stickiness in terms of the costs associated with
change.100 To use a noncontract example, a company incurs costs when
it has used PCs for many years and then shifts its IT department to
Macs. These learning effects arise from past use of a particular norm
within a firm. In the context of contracting practices, the consistent
use of the same contract terms locks in certain benefits to a party.
These may derive from efficiency in drafting, reduced uncertainty in
the ambiguity over the judicial interpretation of the term (interpretive
risk and overhang) and the reduced need to incur attorney's fees. 01
Accordingly, if "lock-in effects" have formed around a regularly used
contract term, switching terms surrenders those savings and thus
forces firms to incur new "switching costs" as they develop similar
synergies from the new term. 02 When the lock-in effect's utility
exceeds the new term's utility, the theory of learning externalities
suggests that the contract term will remain sticky.
Network externalities. Kahan and Klausner also hypothesize
that network externalities may cause some contract stickiness.
99. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
100. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (Or "the Economics of Boilerplate'), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719-25 (1997).
101. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 86, at 659-60 (discussing how externalities
might be the cause of stickiness in default terms).
102. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in
Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 246 (2013).
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Network externalities capture savings that accrue due to the use of a
common term within an industry or network. To take a noncontract
example, the use of compatible telephones yields benefits to individual
firms within an industry.103 In contrast to learning effects, network
effects derive from the contemporaneous use of an industry norm. In
the contractual setting, the use of a familiar term may reduce the
costs of legal representation, since companies need not invest in
educating a lawyer about a familiar term.104 Industry-wide
standardization can also result, thereby reducing contracting costs for
repeat players within the industry. Unlike learning externalities,
which result from costs attributable to changes within the firm,
network externalities result from costs attributable to departure from
accepted terms within the "network" or industry.
Null hypothesis. Finally, these existing accounts must be tested
against the null hypothesis-also identified by Scott and Gulati-that
stickiness is a myth. 05 The null hypothesis, in other words, states that
firms do in fact innovate and respond to changes in the legal
landscape. Under this account, change may not occur instantaneously.
Instead, in what is sometimes described as the "shock model," contract
terms evolve as a result of shocks, such as a judicial interpretation of a
contract term, or some other innovation.106 After "a series of exogenous
shocks," firms experiment with new terms.107 David Hoffman explains:
"What would such shocks look like? A Supreme Court decision making
terms salient-and explicitly approving their enforceability-would be
exemplary. Decisions like AT&T v. Concepcion (validating class-
arbitration waivers) .. . could have spurred attorneys to consider
clauses that they previously would have left unused."108 In response to
103. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 86, at 660.
104. Sometimes, contracting agents can ameliorate these effects. For example, underwriters
and law firms can undertake the front-end investment to change a particular norm within the
industry. Not only do these agents absorb these costs (which can then be spread across industry
players), but they can serve to bridge the disparate interests of firms within the industry and roll
out a new industry standard which firms then replicate.
105. GULATI & ScOTT, supra note 86, at 43.
106. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3
(2013); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical
Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 929-30 (2004).
107. Hoffman, supra note 25 (manuscript at 41) (citing Choi et al., supra note 106). In the
first phase, "the standard form dominates" and established contract drafters will resist any
change. Id. Only after the exogenous shocks of the second phase does "innovation become
standardized" in a third phase. Id.
108. Id. (manuscript at 43-44). Hoffman notes, however, that "proceduralists should expect
that even if the Supreme Court were to validate particular new forms of bespoke
982 [Vol. 67:4:955
2014] "STICKY"ARBITRATION CLAUSES? 983
those shocks, contract terms will change over a period of time when
the shock works its way through a firm's information network.
This section has reviewed the prevailing accounts for why
contracts are sticky, stripped away those theories least likely to apply
in the franchise context, and introduced the null hypothesis-that
contracts are not sticky but respond, albeit sometimes slowly, to
systemic shocks. In the next Section, we map these accounts onto the
particular types of contracts in our study.
2. Stickiness and Franchise Contracts
In the preceding Section, we explained why certain theories of
the stickiness of contracts are less likely to apply in the adhesive
setting. In this Section, we both explain why franchise contracts might
be stickier than other standard form contracts and how consideration
of a Supreme Court decision like Concepcion permits us to test the
proposition.
Franchise contracts might be stickier than other standard form
contracts for several reasons.109 First, franchise agreements have
higher stakes than virtually all consumer contracts.110 The higher
stakes may induce franchisees to read franchise agreements more
carefully and invest more in understanding the agreement's terms."'
procedure ... many contracts would still remain silent about what should happen if the parties
go to court." Id. (manuscript at 44).
109. Prior scholarship has demonstrated that credit card agreements can be modified
through the simple act of conveying the modification by means of a bill stuffer or electronic
communication followed by some period for the consumer to opt out (or, alternatively, accept the
proposed modification by conduct through the use of the card). See David Horton, The Shadow
Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 605, 609 (2010)
(discussing the factors that prevent consumers from opting out of contract amendments). Insofar
as this is true-again, we do not independently test the validity of the proposition in this
Article-this premise too casts doubt on several theories. In particular, overhang theory lacks
much explanatory value under this condition of easy modification. Under conditions where
contracts are easily modified, the bank can simultaneously alter the terms for future
transactions as well as the terms governing the repayment of debts for prior transactions.
(Again, while overhang risk can be reduced, it cannot be eliminated entirely. Consider a company
that is in litigation over the meaning of term A. If, during the litigation, it proposes to modify
that term, the proposed modification still carries overhang risk in the pending litigation.)
110. See Adam B. Badawi, Relational Governance and Contract Damages: Evidence from
Franchising, 7 J. EMPRICAL LEGAL STUD. 743, 753 tbl.3 (2010) (reporting average start-up cost
in sample of franchise agreements of $571,170, with range across types of franchise from low of
$55,150 for home-care franchises to high of $5,459,643 for lodging franchises).
111. By comparison, some scholarship, including empirical research, suggests that
consumers often do not read their contracts. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine
Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 3 (Law and
Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at
http://perma.cc[N34E-DE3Z (examining the extent to which buyers read standard form
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Second, franchise agreements tend to have longer terms than
consumer contracts. 112 The ability to turn over only a fraction of the
total stock of contracts in any given year necessarily affects the
franchisor's incentives to modify its contracts. Not only does it take
time for the parties (or the franchisor) to realize fully the benefits of
the new contract terms, but during the interim, the franchisor faces
the prospect of nonuniform contract terms, which elevates other risks
(e.g., overhang). 113 Third, franchise agreements are more heavily
regulated than many consumer contracts. State franchise laws provide
for disclosure requirements, substantive regulation, and agency
oversight, which may increase the stickiness of franchise agreement
terms. 114 (This last feature of franchise agreements may impose a form
of network externality, albeit one created by public regulation rather
than a privately developed industry norm.)
Evaluating the impact of a Supreme Court decision like
Concepcion enables us to test the relative stickiness of contracts like
franchise contracts. This feature affects several of the explanations
described in the preceding section. The free rider explanation offers a
good example. By definition, if a matter has reached the Supreme
Court (or any court at all, for that matter), at least one firm has
chosen to innovate its contract terms. Thus, at least some of the
incentive for other firms to retain "sticky" terms has diminished-they
can now free ride on the investment of the innovating firm.
Even after one firm innovates, however, follow-on firms might
remain reluctant to change their contract language. The innovating
contracts). For a literature survey, see Clayton P. Gillette, Standard Form Contracts 5-7 (N.Y.U.
Law Sch. Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-18, 2009), available at
http://perma.cc/F5DB-L5XJ?type=pdf (papers.ssrn.com, archived May 8, 2014). Assuming this is
valid (we do not attempt to make an original contribution on that question), this phenomenon
suggests that several other explanations described in the previous section lack much explanatory
value here. For example, there would not be much of a concern about negative signaling because
the consumer would not perceive the "signal" communicated by a change in the contract
language. For similar reasons, interpretive risk, endowment effects, and satisficing again lose
some explanatory value. In short, the "unread" nature of many consumer contracts-again
assuming the validity of this proposition-casts doubt on the explanatory value of theories that
assume parties have symmetrical information and actually perceive the signal sent by a
proposed modification. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 824 (2006). Franchise agreements seem likely to differ from
consumer contracts in that the stakes are much higher, and franchisees are more sophisticated
contracting parties than consumers.
112. See Badawi, supra note 110, at 753 tbl.3 (reporting average term in sample of franchise
agreements of 12.3 years).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94 (discussing overhang).
114. See generally Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed?
Revisiting the Debate over Franchise Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193 (2013).
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firm bears not only the cost of altering its contract language but also
the risk that, in litigation, the language may actually harm its
interests. Consider, for example, the arbitral class waiver: a court
might find that the FAA does not preempt a state law rule
invalidating the class waiver.
But once the Supreme Court rules, the free rider account
suggests that firms should adapt. At this point, much-though
admittedly not all-of the residual litigation risk has dissipated.115
Consequently, follow-on firms should be more inclined to adopt the
innovating firm's new contract language. On the other hand, if
contract terms remained sticky even after the intervening Supreme
Court decision, this would cast doubt on the validity of the free rider
theory (at least for the class of cases we are studying). Thus, our focus
on Concepcion carries force for a variety of explanations that explain
stickiness in terms of agency problems or risk avoidance. These
include not only the free rider theory but also theories like
uncertainty, contract routines, and herd effects. We are interested less
in what particular explanation for stickiness does or does not apply
than in at least some explanation for stickiness possibly holding,
which certainly is the case. We leave distinguishing among these and
other possible explanations for contract stickiness for future research.
To summarize the preceding two sections, the salience of the
accounts for contract stickiness depends critically on the sort of
contract under study. For the type of contract we are studying
(adhesive contracts) and the phenomenon we are studying (the effect
of intervening Supreme Court decisions), theories that presuppose
parties of equal bargaining power (or at least parties in a position to
react to changes in contract language) largely drop out. These include
theories like endowment effects, satisficing, and negative signaling.
By contrast, theories that depend on firm-specific behavior-like free
riders, herd effects, learning externalities, contract routines, and
115. We acknowledge that there will be residual litigation risk over the scope of the
Supreme Court's holding. This residual risk might have a factual or legal basis. Consider, for
example, the AT&T arbitration clause at issue in Concepcion. A follow-on firm might adopt some
but not all of the incentives contained in the AT&T clause; in that case, it bears a residual risk
that a lower court, even after Concepcion, would conclude that this lack of incentives
distinguishes the instant clause from the AT&T clause. Alternatively, a follow-on firm in another
state might mimic completely the AT&T clause. In that case, it still bears a residual risk that a
lower court could construe the applicable unconscionability doctrine in a manner differently from
California's Discover Bank rule (the rule at issue in Concepcion holding that the presence of the
class waiver in the arbitration clause rendered the clause per se unconscionable). It might
thereby conclude that the state's unconscionability doctrine did not sweep as broadly as the
Discover Bank rule and, therefore, was not preempted by the FAA. See infra text accompanying
notes 184-86.
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uncertainty-remain more relevant. And of course, all of these
theories are tested against the null hypothesis. With this theoretical
background, we turn to our hypotheses.
C. Hypotheses
The first set of hypotheses targets the prediction that
Concepcion will result in most or all businesses using arbitration
clauses in their standard form contracts. Those predictions are subject
to question both because using an arbitration clause does more than
contract out of class actions and because contracts may be sticky.
Accordingly, the first set of hypotheses tests the basic assumptions
about firm behavior that animate criticisms of decisions like
Concepcion:
Hypothesis 1. Many or most firms that did not use
arbitration clauses prior to Concepcion will not switch to
arbitration after the decision.
Hypothesis 1A. The firms most likely to switch to
arbitration clauses are ones that previously switched
away from arbitration or otherwise are on the margin
between arbitration and litigation.
If the data support these hypotheses, the next question is, "Why have
firms not switched to arbitration?" The second set of hypotheses
considers the two possible explanations we have suggested:
Hypothesis 2. Using arbitral class waivers is not costless
because arbitration is a bundle of dispute resolution
services, not just a class action waiver. To the extent
this is true, firms will not switch to arbitration after
Concepcion, especially firms that face little risk of class
actions or place a high value on court procedures, such
as the right to appeal.
Hypothesis 3. The use of a dispute resolution clause (or
lack of one) is sticky. The accounts of stickiness suggest
that if a firm previously does not use an arbitration
clause, then they would not be affected by a Supreme
Court decision, even if the Supreme Court decision
might encourage the use of such a clause.
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Hypothesis 3A. A modified version of this hypothesis,
building on Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati's theory of
"shock effect," suggests that the use of arbitration
clauses should increase over time. As Supreme Court
decisions like Concepcion filter through a firm's
network, the firm will eventually invest the resources
necessary to make a change.116
IV. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
In this part, we present the results of our empirical study of
changes in the use of arbitration clauses since Concepcion. Examining
two samples of franchise agreements, we find evidence of at most a
slight shift to arbitration following Concepcion and certainly not the
tsunami predicted by some commentators. We begin by describing our
data and methodology. We then present our basic findings and seek to
reconcile those basic findings with other reports about the use of
arbitration clauses after Concepcion. We conclude with evidence on
whether the limited move to arbitration can best be explained by the
stickiness of franchise agreements or by the nature of arbitration as a
dispute resolution process.
A. Data and Methodology
A number of states-including Minnesota, which is the source
for the franchise agreements studied here-require franchisors to file
Franchise Disclosure Documents ("FDDs") annually before they can
sell franchises in the state." 7 The standard form franchise agreement
116. Possible questions for future research include, to the extent stickiness appears to be
playing a role, which theoretical explanations for contract stickiness seem to be at play. For
franchise agreements, our discussion of the literature suggests limited explanatory value of
several theories in the context of franchise contracts (including negative signaling, interpretive
risk, endowment effects, network externalities, and satisficing). This leaves learning
externalities, overhang, herding, free riders, contract routines, and uncertainty. These varying
theories give rise to possible hypotheses, such as the following: if free rider theory or herding
explained stickiness, we would expect to see more change after the Supreme Court blessed a
clause than beforehand; if learning externalities explained stickiness, then we would expect to
see more change among larger firms than smaller ones; and if contract routines or uncertainty
explained the stickiness of terms within arbitration clauses, then we would expect to see more
change among agreements that had simpler (i.e., shorter) clauses.
117. Franchise Registration Information, http://perma.cc/APZ5-UDUM (mn.gov, archived,
Mar. 10, 2014). For discussion of the representativeness and other uses of the Franchise 500 as a
source of data for research on franchises, as we do here for the cross-section sample, refer to
Drahozal, supra note 20, at 723-24; Drahozal & O'Hara O'Connor, supra note 19.
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(typically redlined to indicate any changes from the previous year)118
is attached to the FDD. In almost every case, the franchisor used a
standard form franchise agreement with state-specific addenda to
address differences in state law. Accordingly, the fact that we obtained
the franchise agreements from Minnesota should not affect the terms
of the agreements we studied.
We used two samples of franchise agreements. The first
consists of franchisors that were among the top franchise
opportunities listed in Entrepreneur Magazine's 1999 Franchise 500
(the "panel sample").119 The sample originally consisted of seventy-five
franchisors; due to business attrition, our current sample now is sixty-
seven franchisors.120 For these franchisors, we collected the dispute
resolution clauses from their franchise agreements in 1999, 2007,
2011, 2012, and 2013,121 which enables us to track changes in the
dispute resolution clauses over time-including before and after
Concepcion.
In addition, we collected franchise agreements from a random
sample of franchisors that filed an FDD with the Minnesota
Department of Commerce both before and after Concepcion (the
"cross-section sample").122 The cross-section sample consists of 214
franchisors and does not overlap with the panel sample; none of the
franchisors in the panel sample is in the cross-section sample.123 For
118. N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC., 2008 FRANCHISE REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE
GUIDELINES pt. II(C)(1) (July 1, 2008), available at http://perma.ccl7JP8.6mWH (nasaa.org,
archived Mar. 10, 2014).
119. 2013 Franchise 500, http://perma.cc/WG5W-DVSE (entrepreneur.com, archived Mar.
10, 2014).
120. The franchisors no longer in the sample include ones that went out of business, merged
into other franchisors, or apparently stopped doing business in Minnesota.
121. For a description of the data collection for the 1999 agreements, see Drahozal, supra
note 20, at 722-26; for a description of the data collection for the 2007 agreements, see Drahozal
& Wittrock, supra note 20, at 90-94.
122. We began with a sample 239 franchises and then excluded 25 franchisors that did not
make filings in Minnesota in 2013. Of the excluded franchisors, one switched to arbitration
between 2011 (i.e., before Concepcion) and 2012 (i.e., after Concepcion), and one switched away
from arbitration.
123. The proportion of arbitration clauses in our cross-section sample might be affected by
our sampling of agreements filed with the Minnesota Department of Commerce. If, for example,
we had instead selected a random sample of franchisors that filed in California, where courts
have been less willing to enforce arbitration clauses, we might find a smaller proportion of
franchise agreements with arbitration clauses before Concepcion. But that bias should decrease,
if not largely disappear, after Concepcion and Amex. Moreover, as noted above, while California
also makes FDDs available online, exemptions from the California franchise-registration statute
exclude most established franchisors from the filing requirement, thus biasing the sample in a
different way. By comparison, our panel sample was selected from a national list of franchisors
and should not be subject to significant geographic biases.
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the cross-section sample, we collected the dispute resolution clause as
it was immediately before the decision in Concepcion (i.e., prior to
April 27, 2011) and the dispute resolution clause in franchise
agreements filed after Concepcion.124 This dataset gives us a broader
view of how franchisors are responding to Concepcion, but without the
historical context.
As indicated, for both samples, the dispute resolution clauses
were collected from the franchise agreements filed with the Minnesota
Department of Commerce. 125 Prior to 2010, franchise agreements were
only available on paper from the Minnesota Department of Commerce.
For 2011 through 2013, we collected the FDDs online from the
Department's website and then extracted information about the
franchise agreement from the FDD. 126 The FDD also serves as the
data source for the number of franchised units of the franchise. 127 We
give little emphasis to the number of franchised units in our analysis,
however, because of various uncertainties in that data.128 The
franchise agreement in the FDD typically is redlined to show changes
from the prior year, so we are able to examine the extent to which
franchisors change their franchise agreements. 129
As noted above, using franchise agreements as a source of data
has advantages over other form contracts. The agreements are
publicly available and have been for a number of years, making
124. For simplicity in data collection, we treated franchise agreements filed with the
Minnesota Department of Commerce on or before April 30, 2011, as filed before Concepcion. But
we also verified that the dispute resolution clauses in those agreements had not changed since
the previous version, usually sometime in 2010.
125. On a handful of occasions, when the agreement was not available from the Minnesota
Department of Commerce, we obtained a copy of the franchise agreement from a database
maintained by the California Department of Corporations. California Electronic Access to
Securities & Franchise Information, http://perma.cc/Q5DC-2SN6 (corp.ca.gov, archived Mar. 10,
2014). While including more years' worth of agreements, the California database has limited
coverage of franchisors because established franchisors are generally exempted from filing in
California. Id.
126. Welcome to CARDS-Commerce Actions and Regulatory Documents Search, http:/
perma.cc/S35J-RK64 (cards.commerce.state.mn.us, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
127. Item 20 of the FDD reports this information. For 1999, the data were derived primarily
from the Franchise 500, and occasionally we used the Franchise 500 as the source for more
recent years to maintain consistency or to fill gaps.
128. First, it is not clear that the number of franchises is an appropriate proxy for size of the
franchise chain because number of units does not necessarily correlate with total sales. Second,
some franchisors may report in the FDD only the number of units of the type of franchise they
are selling at the particular time, not the total number of units of any type in the chain. Third,
franchisors report the number of units as of the end of their fiscal year, which varies by
franchisor.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 179-80.
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available a reasonable degree of historical information. 1s0 We
recognize the limitations of using franchise agreements, however,
which we discuss at length below. 131 Because of those limitations, our
findings here may not be generalizable to other settings in which
standard form contracts are used, such as consumer and employment
contracts. In Section IV.B.3 below, we attempt to reconcile our
findings here with other reports of changes in arbitration clause usage
following Concepcion.132
B. Changes in the Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion:
Empirical Findings
In this Section, we report our empirical findings on changes in
the use of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements following
Concepcion. We find:
* In the panel sample, the use of arbitration clauses increased
from 40.3% of franchisors immediately before Concepcion to
44.8% by 2013 (Hypothesis 1). Of the four franchisors that have
switched to arbitration since Concepcion, three had used
arbitration clauses at some point prior to the decision and
switched back afterwards, while the fourth used arbitration to
resolve some disputes before Concepcion and expanded its use
to all disputes afterwards (Hypothesis lA).
* In the cross-section sample, the net use of arbitration clauses
increased only slightly after Concepcion, with 62.6% of
franchisors using arbitration clauses before Concepcion and
63.6% after the decision. Five franchisors actually switched to
arbitration after Concepcion, but four others switched away
from arbitration, resulting in a net increase of one (Hypothesis
3).
* In the panel sample, the use of class arbitration waivers by
franchisors using arbitration clauses has increased
substantially since 1999, with most of the increase coming
before 2011. In 1999, 51.6% of franchisors with arbitration
clauses also used class arbitration waivers. By 2011,
130. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 149-52.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 153-72.
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immediately before Concepcion, that percentage had increased
to 77.8%, with an additional increase to 86.7% by 2013
(Hypothesis 3A).
1. Changes in the Use of Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements
Contrary to the predictions that all businesses would soon use
arbitration clauses in their standard form contracts after Concepcion,
we find only a slight change in the use of arbitration clauses in both
samples of franchise agreements.
In the panel sample, as shown in Table 1, the percentage of
franchisors using arbitration clauses increased slightly, from 40.3% in
2011 immediately before Concepcion to 41.8% in 2012 and 44.8% in
2013.133 As a percentage of total franchises, the amount of the shift
was similar (from 50.4% of franchises in 2011 to 52.5% of franchises in
2012 and 53.7% of franchises in 2013).134 One franchisor switched to
arbitration in mid-2012, two more in late 2012 and mid-2013, and a
fourth later in 2013. Interestingly, in all four cases, the franchisor had
had prior experience with arbitration. In 1999, GNC included an
arbitration clause in its franchise agreement but by 2007 had switched
to a forum-selection clause. It then switched back to arbitration after
Concepcion, and indeed, many provisions in its current arbitration
clause were identical to those in the 1999 agreement. The pattern for
the Rent-A-Wreck franchise agreement is similar-switching from an
arbitration clause in 2007 to a forum-selection clause in 2011 and then
back to arbitration in late 2012. Although not identical, the Rent-A-
Wreck arbitration clause in 2012 bears many similarities to the one
from 2007. Hungry Howie's switched to arbitration in 2013 for all
disputes; prior to 2013, it used arbitration for some disputes and not
others. And Kahala Corp. (the franchisor for Blimpie sub shops)
switched back to arbitration in 2013 after having switched away from
133. Because Concepcion was decided in April 2011, we measure each year after the decision
as beginning in April. So when we refer to 2012, we mean the year from April 2011 to April 2012,
2013 is the year from April 2012 to April 2013, and so on. At the time this article went to press,
only very partial data for the year April 2013 to April 2014 were available because most
franchisors file their FDDs at the end of March. As a result, we do not include data for 2013-
2014 in the tables. We do note in the text, however, that one additional franchisor switched to
arbitration between April 2013 and when the article went to press. If we calculated the
percentage of franchisors using arbitration clauses by assuming that all franchisors that had not
yet filed their FDDs would keep their dispute resolution clause unchanged, the percentage of
franchisors using arbitration clauses would have increased to 46.3% (31/67) for 2013-2014.
134. Data for 2013-2014 are largely unavailable as yet, as discussed above, so we do not
include those data here. See supra note 133. Also, data for one franchisor are missing for 2010-
2011.
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arbitration in 2008.135 Stated otherwise, these franchisors were all on
the margin between arbitration and litigation-they either had
switched away from arbitration or used it for some disputes-and so
were among the most likely to switch to arbitration following
Concepcion.
Table 1: Change in the Use of Arbitration Clauses in Franchise
Agreements After Concepcion: Panel Sample
2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013
Pre-Concepcion 'Post-Concepcion Post-Concepcion
Arbitration 27 28 30
Clause (40.3%) (41.8%) (44.8%)
No Arbitration 40 39 37
Clause (59.7%) (58.2%) (55.2%)
The panel sample also permits us to examine changes in the
use of arbitration clauses over a longer period of time-beginning in
1999. Figure 1 summarizes the results.136 It reveals a slight, long-term
decline in the use of arbitration clauses by franchisors from 1999
through 2011, which apparently reverses after the decision in
Concepcion.137 Our findings thus might understate the effect of
Concepcion on the use of arbitration clauses, because without
Concepcion, the downward trend might have continued. Stated
otherwise, Concepcion not only might have induced some franchisors
to switch to arbitration, but it also might have induced some
franchisors to continue using arbitration who otherwise might have
switched away from arbitration. That distinction, however, is
immaterial for the predictions we test here.
135. See Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 20, at 97 n.124 (noting the removal of the
arbitration clause from Kahala's 2008 franchise agreement).
136. As discussed supra note 133, one additional franchisor switched to arbitration at the
end of the third quarter of 2013. We do not report overall percentages for the year 2013-2014 in
Figure 1 because most of the data for that period was not available at the time this article went
to press. Given the one switch to arbitration, however, and assuming the franchise agreements
for which data are missing remain unchanged, the percentage of franchise agreements using
arbitration clauses is now up to 46.3% (i.e., back to its level in 1999).
137. The percentages differ slightly from those reported for 2007 by Drahozal & Wittrock,
supra note 20, at 95, for two reasons: first, because our sample has declined to 68 franchisors
from the 71 in that study; and second, because we were able to add one franchisor (which
switched away from arbitration) for that year which previously was unavailable.
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Figure 1: Use of Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements,
1999-2013
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In the cross-section sample, the overall percentage of
franchisors using arbitration clauses was higher than in the panel
sample, as shown in Table 2,138 but that percentage changed only
slightly between 2011 and 2013. In 2011, before Concepcion, 134 of
214 franchise agreements, or 62.6%, included arbitration clauses. In
2013, after Concepcion, 136 of 214 franchise agreements, or 63.6%,
included arbitration clauses. The very slight shift in the aggregate
masks some reshuffling among franchisors: five franchisors in fact
switched to arbitration by 2013, but those changes were largely offset
138. These findings are consistent with William L. Killion, An Informal Study of Arbitration
Clauses Reveals Surprising Results, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 79, 79 (2002) (finding higher rate of
arbitration clauses by franchisors ranked lower in Franchise 500).
2014] 993
A
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:4:955
by three franchisors that switched away from arbitration during the
same period.
Table 2: Change in the Use of Arbitration Clauses in Franchise
Agreements After Concepcion: Cross-Section Sample
2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013
Pre-Concepcion Post-oncepion Post-Concepcion
Arbitration 134 133 136
Clause (62.6%) (62.1%) (63.6%)
No Arbitration 80 81 78
Clause (37.4%) (37.9%) (36.4%)
Finally, Figure 2 shows the percentage of franchisors using
arbitration clauses that also use class arbitration waivers. 139 In 1999,
barely half (51.6%) of franchisors using arbitration clauses also used
class arbitration waivers. By 2011, the percentage had increased to
77.8% and then to 86.7% in 2013. The use of class arbitration waivers
(in franchise agreements, at least) has therefore increased
significantly in the past fifteen years.140
But even so, not all franchise agreements with arbitration
clauses include class arbitration waivers. This result is surprising
because the costs of adding a class arbitration waiver to a contract
with an arbitration clause would seem much lower than the costs of
adding both an arbitration clause and a class arbitration waiver to a
franchise agreement that has neither. Although the benefits of
avoiding class actions would be the same as we described before, the
139. In other words, the denominator for the calculations in Figure 2 differs from the
denominator in Figures 1 and 3. Both Figures 1 and 3 present the percentage of franchisors,
including those that use arbitration clauses and those that do not. Figure 2 presents the
percentage of only those franchisors that use arbitration clauses.
140. Gilles also reports "a clear increase in the popularity of [class arbitration waivers] over
the past decade." Gilles, supra note 15, at 853. She reaches this conclusion by comparing the use
of class arbitration waivers in a nonrandom sample of recent arbitration clauses to the use of
class arbitration waivers reported by studies examining consumer contracts across a range of
industries. Id. at 853 n.104. Although the conclusion she reaches is consistent with our findings
here, her methodology is problematic because she is not comparing the same types of contracts.
For example, the Searle study (one of the studies to which she compares her data) found that all
or almost all credit card and cell phone contracts in the sample included class arbitration
waivers but that no real estate brokerage contracts did. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 83, at
349-50. Gilles does not examine any real estate brokerage contracts, so her results might simply
be due to her comparing different types of contracts rather than any change over time.
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bundling costs identified previously do not apply to the decision to
include a class arbitration waiver in an existing arbitration clause.
We can identify at least three explanations for this less-than-
ubiquitous use of class arbitration waivers.141 First, it may be evidence
of contract stickiness (Hypothesis 3). Franchisors simply may not have
revised their franchise agreements to include class arbitration waivers
even though it would seem beneficial for them to do so. Second,
franchisors may fear, even after Concepcion, that using a class
arbitration waiver might result in the invalidation of their arbitration
clause. Given the Supreme Court's decision reversing the Second
Circuit in Amex, though, any such risk has declined substantially.142
But during the time period studied, there remained some risk that a
court would invalidate an arbitration clause with a class arbitration
waiver on an effective-vindication theory.143 Third, given the Supreme
Court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.,144 franchisors might believe that using a class arbitration
waiver is not necessary. In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that a clause
that was "silent" on class arbitration could not be construed as
authorizing class arbitration.145 That said, arbitral tribunals
continued construing clauses without class arbitration waivers as
authorizing class arbitration even after Stolt-Nielsen,146 and franchise
lawyers continued to recommend that franchisors use class arbitration
waivers. 147 Accordingly, we find this third possible explanation
unlikely.
The explanations explored in the foregoing paragraph all treat
franchisors as interchangeable. Another set of explanations might
differentiate among franchisors, either with respect to their resources
or their interests.148 For example, large franchisors (measured by sales
141. By comparison, 93.6% of credit card issuers using arbitration clauses covering 99.9% of
credit card loans outstanding used class arbitration waivers as of December 31, 2010. Peter B.
Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 39.
142. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
144. 559 U.S. 662 (2010); see also Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2069-70
(2013) (limiting Stolt-Nielsen to its facts).
145. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 687 & n.10.
146. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 IARQ. L.
REV. 1103, 1157-58 (2011).
147. Sawers & Russell, supra note 16 ("The prudent franchisor should not assume that the
absence of express language authorizing class arbitration immunizes the franchisor from class
treatment. Instead, the safe course of action for franchisors is to include a class arbitration
waiver in franchise agreements.").
148. Research on the use of arbitration clauses in credit card agreements suggests such
firm-specific explanations, see Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 24, at 539-40 (observing that
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or number of franchised units) might display a greater tendency to
favor arbitration clauses, coupled with class waivers, to the extent
they perceive themselves to be litigation targets; by contrast, small
franchisors might perceive a lower risk of litigation given that their
pockets are not as deep. Along the same lines, larger franchisors
might be more likely to have in-house legal counsel attuned to the
most significant changes in the legal landscape (and thus more
capable of responding quickly to shocks that result in changes in
contract drafting); by contrast, smaller franchisors may lack the same
personnel ranks and, consequently, be less likely to respond to these
sorts of shocks. Future research might examine such firm-specific
explanations.
operational differences among credit card companies explain their decisions whether or not to
adopt arbitration clauses), as does prior research on the use of arbitration clauses in franchise
agreements. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Agreements, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 580-81 (2003)
(observing that franchisors with large networks and high levels of repeat business are less likely
to employ arbitration clauses).
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Figure 2: Use of Class Arbitration Waivers in Franchise
Agreements with Arbitration Clauses, 1999-2013
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
atm% of Franchisors Using Arbitration Clauses that also Use Class
Arbitration Waivers
0% +
2. Caveats
We recognize and reiterate the limitations of our research.
Initially, we have only two years of data since Concepcion. While that
time period would seem to be long enough to detect changes to
contracts if businesses could in fact quickly and costlessly change their
contracts, to the extent contracts are sticky, implementing those
changes may take longer. That may be particularly true for franchise
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agreements, given their relatively long terms.149 At a minimum, the
relatively short time frame makes it difficult to distinguish between
bundling and stickiness explanations for the limited switching to
arbitration we have observed in franchise agreements.
Second, franchisors might have anticipated the outcome in
Concepcion and so already changed their contracts before the case was
decided. If so, we would not observe a change in the use of arbitration
clauses after the decision. But our panel sample finds no evidence of
increased arbitration clause use leading up to Concepcion; to the
contrary, the use of arbitration clauses continued its slight, long-term
decline up until 2010 and only began to increase after Concepcion.o50
Moreover, even if franchisors anticipated the outcome, fewer than half
of the franchise agreements that we studied use arbitration clauses,
despite the predictions that all would do so after Concepcion.
Finally, and more fundamentally, although often grouped
together with consumer and employment contracts in policy
discussions, 15' franchise agreements differ in a number of respects
from those types of standard form contracts. As discussed above,
franchise agreements have higher stakes, longer terms, and are
subject to more regulation than the typical consumer or employment
contract. 152 As a result, one must be cautious not to extrapolate too
broadly from our findings here to other standard form contracts.
That said, our results at a minimum provide evidence that not
all businesses have switched to arbitration after Concepcion-even
businesses that commentators have argued should switch.
3. Reconciling Our Findings with Other Reports
As noted above, our findings necessarily are limited to
franchise agreements, which differ in important ways from other form
contracts, in particular consumer and employment contracts. 153 In this
Section, we reconcile our findings with other reports of changes in the
use of arbitration clauses since Concepcion.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
151. George Padis, Note, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer and Employment
Arbitration and Class Actions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 665, 669 n.20 (2013) ("Often, franchise
agreements are lumped together with employment agreements and consumer contracts as
problematic areas of adhesive bargaining, because franchisees are often small businesses dealing
with large corporations, and thus lack the bargaining strength to negotiate arbitration clauses in
advance.").
152. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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First, on December 12, 2013, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau ("CFPB") issued a preliminary report on the results
of its study, required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, of "the use of agreements providing for
arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and
consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer
financial products or services."154 The CFPB's findings on changes in
credit card and checking account contracts since Concepcion are
consistent with our findings here: the use of arbitration clauses has
increased somewhat, but most institutions do not use arbitration
clauses. The report found that "[t]he incidence of arbitration clauses in
credit card contracts has increased since Concepcion, but only
slightly"-with five credit card issuers adopting arbitration clauses
after Concepcion and three switching away from arbitration. 55 At the
end of 2012, only 17.0% of credit card issuers, covering 50.2% of credit
card loans outstanding, used arbitration clauses.15 6 A few more
financial institutions have switched to arbitration for their checking
account agreements: in a sample of large financial institutions, 47.7%
used arbitration clauses as of summer 2013, up from 39.8% as of
summer 2012.157 As of summer 2013, however, the CFPB estimates
that "only 7.7% of banks use arbitration clauses for their checking
account contracts" and that "accounts representing some 44.4% of
bank insured deposits are subject to arbitration." 58
Second, anecdotal press reports identified various companies
that have adopted arbitration clauses since Concepcion. The
businesses typically reported as adopting arbitration clauses after
Concepcion are computer software companies and online businesses,
as shown in Table 3.159
154. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a) (2012); see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18
(containing the text of the CFPB's report).
155. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 54. The Report found "no additional
issuers switching to arbitration between December 31, 2012, and June 30, 2013." Id. at 54 n.125.
156. Id. at 22.
157. Id. at 56. The report states that "[eight banks and one credit union switched to
arbitration during that one-year period, while two banks switched away from arbitration." Id.
Because of data limitations, the study was unable to examine changes between the date of the
Concepcion decision and summer 2012.
158. Id. at 25-26.
159. The one exception is Umpqua Bank, which revised its deposit-account agreement to
include an arbitration clause after Concepcion. See infra text accompanying note 165. Professor
Gilles reports that Regions Bank switched to arbitration after Concepcion. Gilles, supra note 15,
at 853 n.105. By comparison, the Wall Street Journal reports that Regions Bank "strengthened
the existing mandatory-arbitration provision contained in its deposit accounts" after Concepcion.
Robin Sidel, No Day in Court for Bank Clients, http://perma.cc/8HL8-QBQN (wsj.com, archived
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These businesses are notable because they are in industries
that, prior to Concepcion, only rarely used arbitration clauses.
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler found that almost no software license
agreements used arbitration clauses or class arbitration waivers in
her 2007 study, 160 a situation that had not changed much prior to
Concepcion.161 Moreover, at least some of the firms (both Sony and
Netflix) had been subject to high-profile class action lawsuits shortly
before they switched to arbitration.162 Finally, the anecdotal reports
only highlight the switch to arbitration of several large players in the
market. Without more systematic data, there is no way to know
whether arbitration clauses are used by most or all firms in the
market, or whether these markets resemble the credit card market, in
which small banks and credit unions often do not use arbitration
clauses.163
Mar. 10, 2014). The CFPB's more systematic evidence on changes in the use of arbitration
clauses in credit card and checking account contracts since Concepcion is described supra text
accompanying notes 154-58.
160. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About
Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 47-48 (Omri Ben-Shahar
ed., 2007) (finding that "only 6 percent of [observed] EULAs" contained an arbitration clause).
161. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 102, at 280.
162. Michael Liedtke, Netflix Class Action Settlement: Service Pays $9 Million After
Allegations OfPrivacy Violations, http://perma.ccl6J4D-PP7T (huffingtonpost.com, archived Mar.
10, 2014); Winda Benedetti, Sony Sued, Could Bleed Billions Following PlayStation Network
Hack, http://perma.cc/FDA3-R3S4 (nbcnews.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
163. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 24, at 559-61.
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Table 3: Press Reports of Firms Switching to Arbitration
Clauses After Concepcion
Company Product Date Switch Reported
Sony'64  Video games September 2011
Umpqua Bank 65  Deposit account January 2012
NetfliX166  Video rental and streaming March 2012
Microsoftl 67  Video games and software May 2012
Valves68  Computer games July 2012
eBayl 69  Online auction September 2012
PayPal170  Electronic payment service October 2012
Instagram'71 Online photo sharing service December 2012
StubHubl7 2  Online ticket market February 2013
All told, the markets for online services and computer software
may reflect a different contracting dynamic than the franchise market.
The former markets were marked by a low initial usage of arbitration
164. Mark Milian, Sony: Supreme Court Ruling Spurred Changes to PlayStation Terms
http://perma.ce/882Q-BQQZ (cnn.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
165. Brent Hunsberger, Umpqua Bank Joins Wells Fargo and Chase in Requiring Customers
to Arbitrate Disputes, Barring Class Actions, http://perma.cc/7XLT-N4L9 (oregonlive.com,
archived Mar. 10, 2014).
166. Jordan Crook, Netflix Doesn't Want You to Sue Them, According to New Terms of
Service, http://perma.ccIU7B2-8CEL (techcrunch.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
167. Tim Fielden, Microsoft on the Issues: Consumer Product and Service Agreement
Updates, http://perma.cclD58D-NXFD (blogs.technet.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
168. Chris Morran, Video Game Publisher/Seller Valve Now Forcing Customers into
Mandatory Binding Arbitration, http://perma.cc/XET8-CFKP (consumerist.com, archived Mar.
10, 2014).
169. Brian Wolfman, New E-Bay Arbitration Agreements with Its Customers Include Class-
Action Ban (but with an Opt-Out), http://perma.ccfH3B2-63GA (pubcit.typepad.com, archived
Mar. 10, 2014); Steven Berk, Ebay Offering Rare Chance to Opt-Out of Forced Arbitration: Nov.
9th Deadline, http://perma.ccLFW8-Q4R5 (thecorporateobserver.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
170. Greg Blankinship, PayPal Adds Class Action Arbitration Waiver to Its Contract,
http://perma.cc/WTG9-TAB8 (classactionblog.mpnsb.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
171. Chris Morran, Here's How to Opt Out of Instagram's New Arbitration Clause,
http://perma.cc/V9VW-EV4T (consumerist.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
172. Chris Morran, Now You Can No Longer File Class-Action Suits Against StubHub; Here's
How to Opt Out, http://perma.cc/4LZP-K8C4 (consumerist.com, archived Mar. 11, 2014).
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clauses, with a number of large firms switching to arbitration after
both Concepcion and the filing of several high-profile class actions. By
contrast, the franchise market had a much higher usage of arbitration
clauses prior to Concepcion and a slight, but not dramatic, move to
arbitration after that case. More research into the online services and
computer software markets would be useful to help provide a better
understanding of why firms in those markets behaved differently than
those in the franchise market, both before and after Concepcion.
C. Are Arbitration Clauses Sticky?
Given our findings that, at least so far, the predicted switch to
arbitration has not yet occurred in franchise agreements, the next
question is, "Why not?" In our theoretical discussion, we identify two
possible reasons. The first is that franchisors in fact have business
reasons not to use arbitral class waivers. By agreeing to arbitrate, in
other words, franchisors would agree to a bundle of dispute resolution
services, at least some of which may be undesirable (Hypothesis 2).173
The second is that form contracts may be sticky (Hypothesis 3).
As discussed above, there is reason to believe that franchise
agreements may be somewhat sticky, albeit perhaps less sticky than
negotiated contracts.'74 Our prior research has found evidence of
stickiness in credit card agreements that continued to list the
National Arbitration Forum ("NAF") as the sole provider of arbitration
services several years after the NAF had ceased administering
consumer arbitrations."16 As a result, the agreements risked at best
court appointment of arbitrators and at worst invalidation of the
arbitration clause. 76 For end-user license agreements prepared by
mass-market consumer software companies, Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler and Robert Taylor reported that "[a]lmost forty percent of the
contracts examined saw at least one standard term change over the
period between 2003 and 2010; some changed more than ten terms."17 7
They explain that, "[w]hile this number could be perceived as low,
especially in an industry as dynamic as software, the results challenge
173. Or perhaps, for reputational reasons, they might decide not to use arbitration clauses.
See supra note 82.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
175. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 141, at 30.
176. Id.
177. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 102, at 274-75.
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conventional views that a large fraction of consumer fine print is set in
stone."178
Here, we develop a simple measure of change in franchise
agreements using the redlined versions of the agreements included in
the FDD. 179 For each franchise agreement for 2011-2012 and 2012-
2013, we counted the number of provisions in the franchise
agreements that were changed substantively. For example, expanding
the parties subject to an arbitration clause (e.g., by expressly
including affiliates) would count as a substantive change.
Renumbering a provision because the parties inserted a new provision
earlier in the agreement would not. We included changes to all types
of provisions of the franchise agreement and counted the number of
provisions with substantive changes rather than the number of
substantive changes. If a single provision was changed in multiple
ways, we counted it only as a single change. This measure of contract
change necessarily is very approximate; it is most useful at the
extremes. Nonetheless, it provides at least a rough measure of the
extent to which franchisors changed their franchise agreements
during the years studied.
Based on the data described above, we categorized each
franchisor by the number of changes in any particular year and the
number of years in which changes were made, as shown in Table 4.
Franchise agreements with ten or more provisions with substantive
changes in any given year were classified as having major changes.
Franchise agreements with at least one but fewer than ten provisions
with substantive changes in any given year were classified as having
minor changes. If the agreement had changes in only one year, the
changes were characterized as periodic; if in both years, they were
characterized as regular. If there were no substantive changes in
either year, we categorized the agreement as unchanged.
178. Id. at 275.
179. See supra text accompanying note 118. When a franchise agreement did not reflect any
changes in redlining, we compared the agreement to the previous year's agreement to determine
whether in fact it was unchanged from the prior year or whether the version of the franchise
agreement we were using was not redlined.
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Table 4: Categorizations for Changes to Franchise
Agreements, 2011-12 & 2012-13
Category Definition
Major, regular Ten or more changed provisions in both years
Major, periodic Ten or more changed provisions in one year
Minor, regular Some but fewer than ten changed provisions in both years
Minor, periodic Some but fewer than ten changed provisions in one year
Unchanged No changes in either year
Table 5 summarizes our categorizations of the changes in the
panel sample by the type of dispute resolution clause used in the
franchise agreement in 2012.180 Note first that 53 of the 67 franchisors
(79.1%) changed at least one provision during the two years we
examined, and 7 of the 67 franchisors (10.4%) changed ten or more
provisions in both years. These are higher percentages than Marotta-
Wurgler and Taylor found for the end-user license agreements they
studied, but we use a more generous definition of change than their
study, so our results are not directly comparable. 18
Table 5: Changes in Franchise Agreements by Type of Dispute
Clause, 2011-12 & 2012-13
Category Arbitration Clause No Arbitration Clause
Major, regular 4 3
Major, periodic 12 15
Minor, regular 7 6
Minor, periodic 1 5
Unchanged 6 8
Total 30 37
180. Two of the agreements switched to arbitration in 2013.
181. See supra text accompanying note 177.
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No clear patterns emerge by type of dispute resolution clause
(or at least none for which we can claim any statistical significance
because of the small sample size). During the period studied, the
percentage of unchanged franchise agreements was similar for both
agreements with and without arbitration clauses. At the other
extreme, a higher percentage of regular, major changes were made by
franchisors using arbitration clauses. For those franchisors making
major changes, either periodic or regular, it seems less likely that
contract stickiness explains the failure to switch to arbitration.
Indeed, almost half (18 of 37) of the franchisors not using arbitration
clauses made major changes to their franchise agreements. Again, we
cannot draw definitive conclusions, but our data at least suggests that
something more than contract stickiness explains why some
franchisors have not switched to arbitration after Concepcion.
An alternative possibility is that dispute resolution provisions
are stickier than other contract provisions, so that the data above
understate the degree of stickiness. We also separately counted the
number of franchisors that made substantive changes to the dispute
resolution clause itself, such as by switching to (or from) arbitration,
or otherwise changing their dispute resolution clause. In 2012, 11 of
67 (or 16.4%) of franchisors changed their dispute resolution clauses.
In 2011, 6 of 67 franchisors (or 9.0%) changed their dispute resolution
clauses. Six of the 11 used arbitration clauses in 2012, while 5 of the 6
in 2011 did so. Not surprisingly, a smaller percentage of franchisors
changed their dispute resolution clauses than changed some other
provision in the franchise agreement. Also as expected, franchisors
that used arbitration clauses were more likely to change their dispute
resolution clause, because arbitration clauses tend to be longer and
more complex than forum-selection clauses. That said, 6 of 17 (or
42.1%) of the franchisors that changed their dispute resolution clause
used forum-selection clauses in their franchise agreements, suggesting
that forum-selection clauses are not necessarily stickier than
arbitration clauses.
Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the stickiness of
franchise agreements partially explains why many franchisors have
not switched to arbitration since Concepcion. Half of the franchisors
that do not currently use arbitration clauses made either no changes
(8 of 37, or 21.6%), or only minor changes (11 of 37, or 29.7%), to their
franchise agreements in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. Those franchise
agreements may be sticky. But a sizable proportion of franchisors that
do not currently use arbitration clauses made major changes to their
franchise agreements in one (15 of 37, or 40.5%) or both (3 of 37, or
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8.1%) of those years. For those franchisors, contract stickiness alone
does not fully explain why they have not switched to arbitration.
V. AMEX AND NONARBITRAL CLASS WAIVERS
Commentators have predicted that the Supreme Court's
decision in Amex will result in a new "rash" of businesses switching to
arbitration clauses to avoid class actions.182 Of course, if all businesses
already had adopted arbitration clauses after Concepcion, as some had
predicted, then Amex would have no additional effect on contracting
behavior. Given our finding that such a switch has not occurred,
however, the likely effect of Amex remains open.
It is too soon to present empirical evidence on the extent to
which businesses switched to arbitration after Amex. Instead, we offer
some thoughts on the legal implications of the decision and how those
implications might affect future contracting behavior.
A. Legal Implications of Amex for Class Waivers
In Amex, the Supreme Court held an arbitral class waiver
enforceable even though the lack of class relief arguably made it
uneconomical to pursue a federal antitrust claim.183 By foreclosing
what appears to be the last major avenue to challenge arbitral class
waivers after Concepcion, the Court in Amex reduced, if not
eliminated, any residual legal uncertainty about their enforceability.
In addition, the dissent in Amex, perhaps inadvertently,
rejected a variation on the effective-vindication challenge. Some
courts, typically state courts, had extended the theory to rights arising
out of state statutes. For example, in Feeney v. Dell, Inc., the
Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to limit the effective-
vindication doctrine to federal statutory rights, instead holding that it
applied to state statutory rights as well. 184 Justice Kagan's dissent in
Amex, however, made clear that such analysis is erroneous:
182. See supra text accompanying note 13.
183. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309-11 (2013).
184. Feeney v. Dell Inc., 989 N.E.2d 439, 455-56 (Mass. 2013), rev'd on rehearing, 993
N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 2013); see also Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (suggesting that effective vindication of state law is available as ground to challenge
arbitration agreement); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (same); Gibson
v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091, 1101 (Ala. 2009) (same). But see Coneffv. AT&T Corp.,
673 F.3d 1155, 1158 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) ('Plaintiffs assert primarily state statutory rights,
but Mitsubishi, Gilmer, Green Tree and similar decisions are limited to federal statutory rights.")
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When a state rule allegedly conflicts with the FAA, we apply standard preemption
principles, asking whether the state law frustrates the FAA's purposes and objectives. If
the state rule does so-as the Court found in AT&T Mobility-the Supremacy Clause
requires its invalidation. We have no earthly interest (quite the contrary) in vindicating
that law. Our effective-vindication rule comes into play only when the FAA is alleged to
conflict with another federal law, like the Sherman Act here. In that all-federal context,
one law does not automatically bow to the other, and the effective-vindication rule
serves as a way to reconcile any tension between them.1 8 5
Given that even the Amex dissenters would have limited the effective-
vindication doctrine to federal statutory rights, cases like Feeney
would seem to be no longer good law.186
Finally, while on its facts Amex addresses arbitral class
waivers, the decision might make courts more likely to enforce
nonarbitral class waivers. 187 Stated otherwise, although the decision
has been criticized as the "worst Supreme Court arbitration decision
ever," 88 it is arguably a class action decision more than an arbitration
decision.
Most of the reasoning in Amex applies to nonarbitral as well as
arbitral class waivers. Thus, as the Amex Court points out, the
effective-vindication doctrine essentially is an application of the bar on
prospective waivers of statutory rights. 18 9 If parties cannot directly
waive a statutory right, they also cannot do so indirectly by using an
unfair arbitration clause.190 The Court then goes on to hold that an
arbitral class waiver does not amount to a prospective waiver of a
statutory right because "the class-action waiver merely limits
arbitration to the two contracting parties. It no more eliminates those
parties' right to pursue their statutory remedy than did federal law
before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938."191
Nothing in that analysis depends in any way on whether a class
185. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
186. Of course, Feeney would be inconsistent with the majority's decision in Amex even if it
had involved federal statutory rights because the basis for the effective-vindication challenge
was a class arbitration waiver. The Massachusetts court later acknowledged that its decision
was incorrect under Amex. Feeney v. Dell, 993 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 2013).
187. As noted above, courts currently are split on the enforceability of nonarbitral class
waivers. See supra text accompanying note 80.
188. Bland, supra note 12; Sternlight, supra note 6.
189. 133 S. Ct. at 2310.
190. As the Court explains in Amex: "That would certainly cover a provision in an
arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights. And it would perhaps
cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to
the forum impracticable." Id. at 2310-11.
191. Id. at 2311. "Or, to put it differently, the individual suit that was considered adequate
to assure 'effective vindication' of a federal right before adoption of class-action procedures did
not suddenly become 'ineffective vindication' upon their adoption." Id.
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waiver uses an arbitration clause. Rather, central to the Court's
analysis seems to be that, at the time Congress enacted the antitrust
laws, class actions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not
yet been adopted. That argument, of course, applies equally to
nonarbitral class waivers.192
Clearly, any application of Amex's reasoning to nonarbitral
class waivers would rest only on dicta because Amex on its facts
involved an arbitral class waiver. Moreover, the Court relied on the
FAA and its own prior arbitration cases at various points in the
opinion. Thus, the Court later explained that "the FAA does, contrary
to the dissent's assertion, favor the absence of litigation when that is
the consequence of a class-action waiver, since its 'principal purpose' is
the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms."193
And the framework the Court applied to reconciling the FAA and the
antitrust laws is its usual one for analyzing whether a federal statute
makes a particular statutory claim nonarbitrable.194 That said, there
is at least an argument that Amex enhances the enforceability not
only of arbitral class waivers but also of nonarbitral class waivers.
B. Arbitral and Nonarbitral Class Waivers in Franchise Agreements:
Predictions and an Empirical Baseline
As stated above, it is too early to evaluate empirically the effect
of Amex on the use of arbitral and nonarbitral class waivers. Instead,
we offer some predictions about how businesses are likely to respond
to that case.
First, to the extent businesses refrained from switching to
arbitration after Concepcion because of residual legal uncertainty
about the effective-vindication doctrine, those businesses might switch
after Amex. But to the extent businesses avoided arbitration because
of its limited right of appeal or other bundling costs, one would not
expect all or even most businesses to begin using arbitration, even
192. On this view, an open question after Amex is how to deal with a statutory right arising
out of a federal statute enacted after the creation of class action procedures under the Federal
Rules-particularly the adoption of the current version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in
1966. For arbitral class waivers, the Court's analysis suggests that it would use its general
framework for nonarbitrability. See id. at 2309-10. Presumably, that framework would not
apply, at least not directly, to nonarbitral class waivers.
193. Id. at 2312 n.5 (citations omitted) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)).
194. Id. at 2309-10.
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after Amex.195 Likewise, Amex will have little effect on the stickiness
of franchise agreements, although over time, the use of arbitration
might nonetheless increase as firms slowly adopt contractual
innovations.
Second, as suggested above, Amex might enhance the
enforceability of nonarbitral class waivers. But because a nonarbitral
class waiver does not use an arbitration clause, the FAA would not
apply. There would be no federal law basis, therefore, for preempting
state law regulation. As a result, even if Amex does apply to
nonarbitral class waivers, states should still be able to invalidate
them as unconscionable (or otherwise regulate those provisions by
statute, regulation, or court decision).196 Thus, one might expect to see
varied state approaches to regulating nonarbitral class waivers, much
as one saw with arbitral class waivers prior to Concepcion.197
Conversely, unlike arbitral class waivers, nonarbitral class
waivers should have no bundling costs. The only change to the
litigation process the parties are making is to waive class actions;
other characteristics of litigation (such as the availability of appeals)
stay the same. As such, businesses that want to waive class actions
but also maintain their usual appeal rights would, all else equal,
prefer nonarbitral class waivers.
Whether the legal uncertainty or the absence of bundling costs
predominates is an empirical question, and it is difficult to make any
definitive predictions. As Figure 3 indicates, prior to Amex,
enforceability considerations appear to have predominated. More than
twice as many franchisors in the panel sample used arbitral class
195. Our hypothesis about arbitration and bundling costs dovetails with some of the
arguments of Ted Eisenberg and Geoff Miller about the paucity of arbitration agreements in
certain business-to-business contracts. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight
from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly
Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 368 (2007) ("The paucity of such clauses may partially
reflect the view of corporate counsel that the decision whether to include binding arbitration in
an agreement is not one that can be made across the board, but rather depends on the needs and
circumstances of the parties."). Here, however, the bundling costs influence the behavior of a
single party (the franchisor) as opposed to two equally sophisticated business parties (the subject
of Eisenberg and Miller's research).
196. In addition, there might be arguments against the enforceability of nonarbitral class
waivers in addition to state law unconscionability. See, e.g., Martrano v. Quizno's Franchise Co.,
LLC, Civil Action No. 08-0932, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52025, at *87 (W.D. Pa. June 15, 2009)
(invalidating nonarbitral class waiver as inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
197. Cf. ALAN S. KAPLINSKY, SCORECARD ON WHERE FEDERAL AND STATE APPELLATE
COURTS AND STATUTES STAND ON ENFORCING CLASS ACTION WAIVERS IN PRE-DISPUTE
CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 42-43 (2010), available at http://perma.cc/8E8Z-2GJW
(summarizing "final tally" of different courts on enforceability of arbitral class waivers prior to
Concepcion).
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waivers over nonarbitral class waivers (38.9% versus 16.4% in
2013).198 The ratio is similar for the cross-section sample, although the
use of both arbitral (51.4%) and nonarbitral (18.7%) class waivers is
higher there than in the panel sample. By comparison, in other
standard form contracts (such as credit card and cell phone
agreements), arbitral class waivers overwhelmingly predominate. 99
This result may be due to greater uncertainty about the enforceability
of nonarbitral class waivers in those settings, or it may suggest that
bundling costs are lower in those settings, so that there is less benefit
to using nonarbitral class waivers instead of arbitral class waivers.
198. The increase in arbitral class waivers and the decline in nonarbitral class waivers in
2013 offset each other to some extent because of one franchisor that previously used a
nonarbitral class waiver switching to an arbitral class waiver.
199. David Hoffman finds only a small number of nonarbitral class waivers in credit card
agreements, all of which appeared in contracts with arbitration clauses. See Hoffman, supra note
25 (manuscript at 29-30). Arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers clearly are dominant
in cell phone contracts. See Drahozal & O'Hara O'Connor, supra note 19.
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Figure 3: Use of Arbitral Class Waivers and Nonarbitral Class
Waivers in Franchise Agreements, 1999-2013
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Amex may enhance the enforceability of nonarbitral class
waivers while leaving their bundling benefits unchanged, making
them more attractive on the margin. Since 1999, the use of
nonarbitral class waivers in the panel sample has increased at a faster
rate than the use of arbitral class waivers. And in both samples, the
overall use of nonarbitral class waivers is higher than one might
expect given the limited attention to such waivers by courts and
academics. Whether the enhanced enforceability as a result of Amex
will be enough to result in a greater use of nonarbitral class waivers is
as yet unknown.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
After Concepcion, commentators predicted that all or most
businesses would soon switch to arbitration clauses. This paper tests
that prediction and finds it unsupported. Based on our samples of
franchise agreements, we find only a small switch to arbitration, not
the tsunami predicted. In the panel sample, the use of arbitration
clauses increased from 40.3% of franchisors immediately before
Concepcion to 44.8% in 2013. The four franchisors that have switched
to arbitration after Concepcion all were on the margin between
arbitration and litigation: three had used arbitration clauses at some
point prior to Concepcion and switched back, while the fourth used
arbitration to resolve some disputes and expanded its use. In the
cross-section sample, the net use of arbitration clauses was virtually
unchanged after Concepcion, with 62.6% of franchisors using
arbitration clauses before the decision and 63.6% after. Five
franchisors switched to arbitration after Concepcion, while three
others switched away, leaving a net increase of one. We also find that
the use of class arbitration waivers by franchisors already using
arbitration clauses has increased substantially over time, with most of
the increase coming before 2011 (from 51.6% of franchisors in 1999 to
77.8% in 2011, with a further increase to 86.7% in 2013).
These findings have a number of implications. First and most
obviously, they call into question some of the empirical predictions
following Concepcion and Amex. So far, at least, not all or even most
businesses are switching to arbitration clauses after Concepcion. As
we have noted before, however, one would expect those businesses
most susceptible to class actions to be the most likely to switch.
Second, the Article cautions against unquestioning acceptance of the
common parade-of-horribles arguments often made in litigation.
Third, the Article adds to our understanding of the nature of
arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. An arbitration clause
does more than waive class actions. It brings with it other
characteristics of the arbitration bundle of dispute services,
discouraging businesses from using arbitration even after Concepcion
and Amex. Fourth, the Article provides insights into the nature of
contract change and innovation. We find a significant degree of change
in franchise agreements among franchisors in the panel sample,
suggesting that contract stickiness is not the sole reason for the
limited switching to arbitration clauses after Concepcion. Moreover,
our findings as to franchise agreements suggest that Supreme Court
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decisions may not always be the sort of systemic shock likely to result
in contract change.
Finally, we offer a first look at how the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Amex might affect contracting behavior. Although on its
facts Amex involves the enforceability of an arbitral class waiver, the
decision could be read as applying to nonarbitral class waivers as well,
at least as to certain federal statutory claims. Businesses that want to
avoid the bundling costs of arbitration, such as the limited right to
appeal, would prefer to use nonarbitral class waivers. Amex might
enhance the enforceability of those waivers, and thus to some degree
increase their use.
$
